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ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT: THE NEED FOR A
FULLY DEVELOPED AND COMPREHENSIVE SET OF
STATUTORY DEFAULT LEGAL RULES
JACK M. GRAVES*
ABSTRACT
This Article analyzes the United States Federal Arbitration Act, as a
statutory framework for effective arbitration of contract disputes. While
arbitration under this Act has been subject to ever increasing criticism
and calls for reform on a variety of fronts—most often from the
perspective of consumer or employment arbitration—this Article focuses
specifically on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and critically
evaluates the Act as a set of default legal rules governing arbitration as a
unique contractual business relationship.
The Article first looks at arbitration from a contractual default rules
perspective and then employs this perspective to analyze: (1) the existing
federal statutory scheme; (2) the developing body of federal “common
law” governing arbitration; (3) the potential impact of state legislation
governing arbitration; and (4) the use of private rules to govern
arbitration. Finally, the Article looks at the related doctrines of
“competence-competence” and separability under U.S. law, specifically
focusing on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West,
Inc. v. Jackson. The Article ultimately concludes with a call for an entirely
new federal statute governing both domestic and international commercial
business-to-business arbitration.
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INTRODUCTION
The basic idea of arbitration is deceptively simple. Two or more
persons choose to resolve their disputes privately, thereby foregoing
traditional court adjudication. Upon closer examination, of course, we
discover that this simple theoretical construct often raises a variety of
challenging and complex issues in its practical application.1 In some cases,
these issues may be resolved by reference to the parties’ arbitration
agreement, which may include a designated arbitral institution or a set of
specified rules for conducting the arbitration. In many other cases,
however, the parties must look for answers within the applicable legal
framework governing their arbitration agreement.
In the United States, arbitration is largely governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA).2 The FAA governs both domestic3 and
international4 arbitration, though it may, under certain circumstances, give
way to or be supplemented by state laws governing arbitration.5 In the
case of international commercial arbitration, the FAA also incorporates
either the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention)6 or the Inter-American
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama
Convention).7 This broad legal frame-work—as a default source of the
parties’ rights and obligations under domestic and international
agreements to arbitrate commercial, business-to-business disputes—serves
as the focus of the Article.
1

For example, who decides if the parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute; how many
arbitrators are required; what happens if one of the parties refuses to cooperate; how
much discovery is allowed; what sort of hearing procedures are appropriate; and to what
extent the arbitrator’s award is subject to any sort of judicial review?
2
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
3
Id. §§ 1-16 (2006).
4
Id. §§ 201-307 (2006).
5
The requirements for choosing state arbitration law are not entirely clear. See
generally George A. Bermann, Ascertaining the Parties’ Intentions in Arbitral Design,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1013 (2009) (discussing the application of “generic” choice of law
clauses, the scope of a state’s arbitration laws, and the interplay between federal and state
arbitration law). The extent to which the FAA preempts state law remains open to
significant unresolved questions. See Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act
Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 407-09 (2004) [hereinafter Drahozal, FAA Preemeption].
Each of these issues is explored more fully. See infra Part II.C.
6
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
7
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention].
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As a prelude to an examination of the legal framework governing
arbitration, it is worth considering briefly the nature of arbitration from a
few distinctive possible viewpoints. Arbitration, like the proverbial
“Elephant” examined by the “Blind Men,”8 is many different things to
different people—depending on one’s perspective or the lens through
which it is examined.
For example, many critics focus on arbitration as a waiver of
fundamental rights, often accomplished with largely unread form
contracts.9 One might reasonably ask whether arbitration should be highly
regulated by mandatory rules, lest stronger parties take undue advantage
of weaker parties. In fact, one might further ask whether ex-ante
agreements between such parties should be enforced at all.10
Another lens through which one might view arbitration is that of a
binding dispute resolution “procedure.” From this perspective, arbitration
is simply a variation on existing court procedures available for the binding
resolution of private disputes—one with private judges, perhaps fewer
formalities, and less post-decisional review, but nonetheless a binding
dispute resolution procedure that in many ways resembles court
adjudication.
From a slightly different perspective, one might view arbitration, not
by way of comparison to any sort of public adjudication, but instead, as
one of many alternatives to such binding adjudication commonly
described as alternative dispute resolution or ADR. From this perspective
8

See JOHN GODFREY SAXE, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE POEMS OF JOHN
GODFREY SAXE 135 (J.R. Osgood ed., 1873). The parable of the blind men and the
elephant has also been attributed to the Buddha. See also JOSEPH MORRISSEY & JACK
GRAVES, INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW AND ARBITRATION, 299-300 (2008) (employing
this analogy to introduce the law and practice of arbitration). Professor Park has used this
same analogy in reference to arbitration, albeit for the purpose of drawing somewhat
different distinctions. See William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration:
The Case for FAA Reform, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 1241, 1242 n.1 (2003) [hereinafter
Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration]; WILLIAM W. PARK, ARBITRATION OF
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 222 n.1 (2006). In each case, Professor Park points
out a broad variety of legal disputes that might be resolved through arbitration.
9
See, e.g., Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An
Economic Analysis, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 211-12 & nn.2-4 (2000).
10
Several scholars have touched on this question. See generally Richard A. Bales &
Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More Equitable Federal Arbitration Act, 113
PENN ST. L. REV. 1081 (2009) (noting that scholars “have not shared the Supreme
Court’s endorsement of compulsory arbitration”); JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, Consumer
Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127 (2006);
Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 449 (1996).
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one might, for example, consider the differences between binding
arbitration and voluntary mediation, conciliation, or other forms of
assisted settlement.
From an international or transnational perspective, arbitration takes on
additional benefits and challenges. Parties from different legal cultures, as
well as private and state entities, often particularly prefer the sort of
neutral forum provided by arbitration, and arbitral awards are generally
easier to enforce across national borders.11 However, various national laws
governing arbitration may differ in ways that affect the nature of the
arbitral process. Lastly, one might view arbitration as a matter of
contract—examining arbitration agreements as fully independent and
separable consensual agreements, even when contained within broader
agreements for goods, services, or other contractual rights and obligations.
Each of these perspectives is of course instructive, and a full
understanding of arbitration requires some level of understanding of all of
them (just as a full understanding of the proverbial elephant requires an
understanding of all of its parts). This Article will focus on arbitration as
contract—not because this perspective is any more important than any
other, generally, but because it provides particularly useful insights in
evaluating the current state of United States law governing commercial
arbitration and potential proposals for its improvement. Specifically, this
Article will focus on commercial, business-to-business arbitration and
examine the effectiveness of the existing American legal framework
governing arbitration agreements as a unique form of contract.
While others have explored the contractual nature of commercial
arbitration, such explorations typically focus on the broad autonomy
granted to parties in structuring the private dispute resolution
mechanism.12 Somewhat less has been written about the law governing
commercial arbitration as a set of contractual default rules,13 and even less
11

William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 656-57 (1989).
12
See generally Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract
Model of Arbitration, 74 TUL. L. REV. 39 (1999) (noting that parties add “customized
features” to arbitration agreements); Thomas Carbonneau, The Exercise of Contract
Freedom in the Making of Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189
(2003) (explaining that freedom of contract is embodied in arbitration agreements);
Thomas Stipanowich, Arbitration and Choice: Taking Charge of the “New Litigation,” 7
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 383 (2009) (noting the need for “real choice” in arbitration
agreements).
13
Much of the literature instead focuses on the tension between broad party autonomy
and various proposals of mandatory rules for the protection of consumers and employees
in arbitration, and the literature addressing default rules has tended to work around the
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has been written on the need for a singular, comprehensive and systematic
treatment of both domestic and international commercial arbitration.14
Originally enacted in 1925, the “venerable” FAA has been subject to
increasingly frequent critiques and calls for amendment. As suggested
above, many of these critiques argue for greater protection of perceived
“weaker” parties, such as consumers and employees, and propose either
stronger mandatory legal rules protecting such parties or the complete
exclusion of these parties from the effects of ex-ante arbitration
agreements.15 The FAA has also been subject to critiques and calls for
edges of current federal law, as reflected in the Federal Arbitration Act. See generally
EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
(2006) (noting the need for a reformulation of federal arbitration law).
14
See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, The Case for the UNCITRAL Model—An Introduction, 4
INT’L ARB. NEWS 2, 2-4 (2004); Daniel M. Kolkey, Reflections on the U.S. Statutory
Framework for International Commercial Arbitrations: Its Scope, Its Shortcomings, and
the Advantages of U.S. Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
491, 534 (1990) (calling for revision or replacement of the FAA, but limiting focus to
international commercial arbitration); see also James M. Gaitis, The Federal Arbitration
Act: Risks and Incongruities Relating to the Issuance of Interim and Partial Awards in
Domestic and International Arbitrations, 16 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 3-5 (2005) (calling
for replacement of the FAA, but focusing specifically on interim and partial awards).
15
See, e.g., Margaret Moses, Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge? 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 147, 189 (2010); Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice,” 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 535,
548 (2005). Under most national legal systems, pre-dispute arbitration agreements
involving consumers, employees, and other highly regulated contractual relationships are
invalid and unenforceable. See Margaret Moses, Privatized “Justice”, supra; Christopher
R. Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration in the United
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 233, 253 (2006) [hereinafter Drahozal, New Experiences
of International Commercial Arbitration]. There is currently legislation before both
houses of Congress that would achieve a similar result under United States law—
rendering pre-dispute arbitration agreements invalid and unenforceable with respect to
employees, consumers, franchisees, civil rights claimants, and other parties whose
transactions are statutorily regulated based on unequal bargaining power. S. 931, 111th
Cong. (2009); H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009). The prospects for passage of the foregoing
are uncertain at this time. Congress has, however, recently passed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010),
which provides for regulatory oversight and potential restriction of arbitration of financial
disputes involving consumers. See Karen Halverson Cross, Letting the Arbitrator Decide
Unconscionability Challenges, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. (forthcoming 2011),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1552966. In one respect, the elimination of ex ante
arbitration agreements involving consumers, employees, and other protected parties—
which raise a whole host of unique issues—might very well make it much easier to
address the inadequacy of the FAA, as related to commercial, business-to-business
arbitration. It is often observed that one of the most significant challenges in amending
the FAA is the fear of opening the proverbial “Pandora’s box” of special interests,
particularly those involving consumer and employment arbitration. Park, The Specificity
of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1295; see also Drahozal, FAA Preemption,
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amendment to correct a variety of other deficiencies.16 The problems
presented by the FAA are perceived by many to be particularly acute in
the context of international transactions, leading to calls for a variety of
potential solutions, including amendment,17 a new “restatement” of
existing common law,18 and even a completely new statute specifically
governing international commercial arbitration.19 However, there have
been very few, if any, thorough examinations of the potential value of a
comprehensive new statute governing both domestic and international
commercial arbitration.20 This Article attempts to fill that void. The
objective of this Article is to explore more fully the idea of commercial,
business-to-business arbitration,21 not simply as a contract subject to
supra note 5, at 235. With these concerns removed, it may be easier to address more
basic business concerns regarding the existing legal structure. See Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Arbitration: The New Litigation, 2010 ILL. L. REV. 1, 57 (2010) (explaining
that an understanding of key contextual differences between business-to-business
transactions, as compared to consumer and employee transactions, is essential to
lawmakers); Thomas E. Carbonneau, Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration,
10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 395, 417-18 (2009) (noting the “maul[ing]” of U.S.
domestic arbitration by the “claws of politicalization”). However, depending on the final
structure of any amendment addressing consumer or employment arbitration, important
elements of business-to-business, commercial arbitration might be adversely affected. See
generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, “Arbitracide”: The Story of Anti-Arbitration
Sentiment in the U.S. Congress, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 233 (2007); Edna Sussman, The
Arbitration Fairness Act: Unintended Consequences Threaten U.S. Business, 18 AM.
REV. INT’L ARB. 455 (2007) (addressing similar legislation to the current legislation cited
above). The comprehensive approach to new legislation ultimately suggested by this
article would, however, avoid such unintended spillover from any efforts to amend the
current statute.
16
See Edward Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration
System: Choice and Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 63-87 (2006).
17
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1242-43.
18
George A. Bermann, et al., Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1333 (2009) (outlining the purpose, scope, and
drafting process of the Third Restatement on International Commercial Arbitration).
19
See Coe, supra note 14, at 2-4.
20
For two excellent examples of recent national legislation governing both domestic
and international commercial arbitration, one might consider the United Kingdom’s
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23 (Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/
1996/23/contents (demonstrating a statute with a common law heritage), or Germany’s
Arbitration Act, Schiedsverfahrensrecht [Arbitration Act], Jan. 1, 1998 (Ger.), available
at http://www.dis-arb.de/materialien (showing a statute with a civil law heritage).
21
This Article will address both domestic and international commercial arbitration,
but will exclude arbitration of consumer and employment agreements, each of which
present various issues that differ significantly from those faced in commercial, businessto-business arbitration.
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autonomous ordering, limited by any appropriate mandatory legal rules,
but as a sufficiently unique and important genus of contract to justify a
specific, comprehensive, and systematic legal regime, complete with a
fully developed set of default legal provisions.
This Article begins, in Part I, by examining the specific potential for
incomplete commercial agreements to arbitrate disputes and the
application of various theories of default rules to these incomplete
agreements. Under the vast majority of legal regimes governing
arbitration, including the FAA, a simple agreement to final and binding
arbitration of commercial disputes is fully enforceable—even if the
agreement says little, if anything, else about the process of dispute
resolution.22 Thus, an agreement to arbitrate presents a number of classic
issues in providing for default rules, as well as some particularized issues
based on the nature of an arbitration agreement. These issues are further
analyzed in terms of the theory of nominate contracts and analogized to
the manner in which American law treats agreements for the sale of
goods23 and partnership agreements24—albeit by reference to uniform state
law rather than a federal statute.25 In considering these issues, the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration
(UNCITRAL Model Law)26 provides a useful point of comparative
reference, as a comprehensive statutory scheme providing a broad array of
default rules governing arbitration.
22

An arbitration agreement “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity of the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2006).
23
See generally U.C.C. art. 2 (superseded 2003).
24
See generally UNIF. P’SHIP ACT (1997).
25
This distinction is more fully discussed infra, Part II.
26
Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade
Law, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/40/17, annex I, at 81-93 (June
21, 1985) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law]. This model law has been adopted, in
substance, by over fifty countries and six U.S. states. See Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model
Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/encitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.h
tml (last visited Mar. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law]. For a
discussion of the effect of U.S. state adoptions see infra Part II.C.3 on the law governing
international commercial arbitration. At least one country, Germany, has also adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law to govern domestic arbitration as well. Dr. Stefan Kröll,
Germany, in III INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1, 1 (Albert
Jan van den Berg ed., 2007). The UNCITRAL Model Law was amended in 2006 to
modernize the writing requirement (art. 7) and add a far more comprehensive set of
provisions governing interim measures. See Model Law on Int’l Commercial Arbitration
of the U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N.
Doc. A/61/17, annex I at 56-60 (as revised on July 7, 2006) [hereinafter UNCITRAL
Model Law—2006 Amendment].
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Part II addresses potential sources of gap filling for incomplete
contracts, beginning with an analysis of existing law under the FAA—a
statute almost entirely devoid of default legal rules regarding the conduct
of arbitration proceedings.27 In evaluating the effectiveness of the FAA as
a set of default legal rules, Part II.A also looks at a variety of challenges
under the existing multi-part statutory structure, while Part II.B addresses
the broader question of whether gaps in agreements to arbitrate are more
effectively filled by courts under a common law approach or by the
legislature under a comprehensive statutory approach.
Part II.C then examines the question of whether gaps—if statutorily
filled—are best addressed by state or federal law. While most state laws
historically provided little more than the FAA in the way of default rules,
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000 (RUAA)28 expressly
attempts to fill this void with respect to domestic arbitration.29 However, it
is debatable whether RUAA goes far enough in providing a
comprehensive statute, and its effectiveness is significantly limited by the
potentially broad and, to some degree, uncertain preemptive effect of the
FAA on various matters addressed by RUAA.30 A number of U.S. states
have attempted to fill the void left by the FAA with respect to
international commercial arbitration by adopting at least substantial
portions of the UNCITRAL Model Law.31 However, these adoptions have
not been particularly uniform,32 and significant unresolved issues of
preemption call into question the effectiveness of such adoptions.33
Part II.D addresses the availability of various institutional and ad hoc
arbitration rules and the potential that such rules might obviate the need
for any default legal rules. In comparing the relative value and
effectiveness of default legal rules versus the parties’ own agreement,
including privately chosen rules, Part II.D addresses the specific
challenges of the unique contractual version of competence-competence
(the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to decide its own jurisdiction)

27

Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra note
15, at 236, 238.
28
UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT (2000) [hereinafter RUAA].
29
Id. at Prefatory Note.
30
See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 420 tbl.1.
31
See Jack J. Coe Jr., The Serviceable Texts of International Commercial Arbitration:
An Embarrassment of Riches, 10 WILLIAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RES. 143, 148 (2002).
32
Gerold Herrmann, UNCITRAL’s Work Towards a Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration, 4 PACE L. REV. 537, 538 (1984).
33
See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 407-25.
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developed by the United States Supreme Court in its interpretation of the
FAA.
In conclusion, this Article calls for a new and comprehensive federal
statutory scheme governing domestic and international commercial
arbitration—and fully replacing the existing Federal Arbitration Act. Such
a scheme could eliminate the need for state law or any “restatement” of
the existing common law governing arbitration in this country and would
fully complement the use of private rules of arbitration, to the extent the
latter might be incorporated by the parties into their arbitration agreement.
I. INCOMPLETE COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS TO ARBITRATE:
THE NEED FOR DEFAULT RULES
Parties may conclude a binding agreement to arbitrate their disputes by
simply saying so in writing.34 They need not say anything more about the
specific nature of their intent. As long as they agree to final and binding
arbitration of a defined range of disputes and the dispute in question falls
within the scope of this range, each of the parties is fully bound to
comply.35 In agreeing to arbitration, the parties will have effectively
displaced a detailed and fully developed set of procedures for adjudication
of their dispute by a court. In the case of a simple, bare-bones agreement
to arbitrate, however, the parties will have provided nothing to replace
these court procedures. While a simplified dispute resolution procedure is
admittedly one of the major reasons parties choose arbitration, few would
likely say they chose arbitration for the lack of any procedure at all. Thus,
we have a very real potential for binding arbitration agreements that lack a
significant degree of completeness.

34

In fact, an agreement need not even necessarily be in writing under the current
version of the UNCITRAL Model Law. See UNCITRAL Model Law—2006
Amendment, supra note 26, art. 7. See also Jack Graves, ICA and the Writing
Requirement: Following Modern Trends Towards Liberalization or Are We Stuck in
1958?, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 36 (2009) (discussing the liberalization of form
requirements for arbitration agreements). However, the extent to which national
legislatures will follow this trend towards liberalizing form requirements governing
arbitration agreements is yet to be determined. Id. at 39.
35
Of course, the parties can always mutually agree to modify or terminate their
agreement, as in the case of any contract. However, an agreement on the resolution of
disputes is often particularly difficult to modify at the time of its performance because
parties in need of binding dispute resolution will often have a difficult time agreeing on
anything.
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A. Reasons for Incomplete Arbitration Agreements
All contracts are, to at least some degree, incomplete.36 The reasons
for this lack of completeness vary, but might generally be divided into two
broad categories: (1) lack of ex ante awareness of all of the factual or legal
issues that might ultimately arise between the parties; and (2) lack of
willingness or ability to expend the time, energy, goodwill, or financial
capital to resolve the issue at the time of contract formation.37 The reasons
for the latter source of incompleteness are particularly acute in the context
of arbitration agreements.
In some circumstances, “the very act of negotiating for a specific
contract term may signal negative information to the other party.”38 While
the basic suggestion of resolving any disputes through arbitration might
generally be viewed in a positive light,39 attempts to provide further details
with respect to such arbitration might very well suggest that the party
suggesting these details believes an arbitrated dispute to be a likely
outcome of the parties’ relationship.40 Or, even worse, any detailed
negotiation of an arbitration agreement might be seen as an attempt to gain
a tactical advantage in the event of such an outcome.41 Thus, an arbitration
agreement is even more likely to be incomplete as a result of the perceived
costs of completing the agreement more fully.
36

Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent,
78 VA. L. REV. 821, 821 (1992).
37
Id. at 822; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 94 (1989) (defining,
more narrowly, the former category based on one party’s strategic behavior in
consciously withholding information from its contracting partner). In the analysis that
follows, this Article will treat this alternative source of incompleteness discussed by
Ayres and Gertner as a subset of the broader category of cases in which the parties’
knowledge is incomplete, for whatever reason.
38
Stephen J. Choi, The Problem with Arbitration Agreements, 36 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1233, 1236 (2003).
39
At a very basic level, a general suggestion at the time of contracting that the parties
agree to stay out of court would often be seen as quite positive in terms of the future
relationship.
40
Choi, supra note 38, at 1236. In addition, even sophisticated parties will often enter
into a contractual relationship with an overly optimistic belief in their ability to avoid
disputes, thereby reducing the potential value of “completing” the dispute resolution
term. Id.
41
In fact, at least one author suggests negotiating arbitration agreements in hopes of
achieving just such a tactical advantage. Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 388-89.
However, this same author agrees that, as a practical matter, this is often quite difficult,
because parties intent on making a deal are reluctant to dwell on the subject of possible
conflict resolution. Id. at 390.

238

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:227

Many parties, as well as many of their transactional counsel, will also
often lack a thorough understanding of the myriad of issues that may—and
all too often do—arise during the process of resolving a dispute through
arbitration.42 When considering the options for binding dispute resolution,
the parties essentially have two choices: (1) litigation; or (2) arbitration.
While there are a host of positive, well documented reasons why parties
affirmatively choose arbitration,43 many also choose it simply because of
what it is not—in effect, choosing arbitration simply because it is not
litigation.44 As a general alternative to litigation—albeit one that many
parties do not fully understand—an agreement to arbitrate will often be
incomplete based on the parties’ lack of knowledge regarding many of the
nuanced details of arbitration.
When we consider both the lack of knowledge with respect to many
parties and their transactional counsel, as well as the significant potential
costs of negotiating terms in specific contemplation of an eventual
contract dispute, it is easy to see why many arbitration agreements are
incomplete. This of course leads to the question of how, if at all, such
agreements should be completed.
B. Should the Law Fill Gaps in Any Manner When an Arbitration
Agreement is Incomplete?
The initial question is whether gaps in an incomplete arbitration
agreement should be filled at all. The act of filling gaps in the parties’
agreement is ultimately a double-edged sword. On one hand, completing
those items the parties left out due to ignorance or the high cost of
completion would seemingly serve the parties’ interests in giving full
effect to their intentions.45 On the other hand, completing the parties’
42

Id. at 389.
See Christopher Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do Businesses Use (or Not Use)
Arbitration Clauses? 25 OHIO ST. J. DISP. RESOL. 433, 435-37 (2010); Hon. Curtis E. von
Kann, A Report Card on the Quality of Commercial Arbitration: Assessing and
Improving Delivery of the Benefits Customers Seek, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 499,
500-01 (2009); see also Loukas Mistelis & Crina Baltag, Recognition and Enforcement of
Arbitral Awards and Settlement in International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and
Practices, 18 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 319, 320, 322 (2008) (explaining a 2008 survey of
corporate attitudes towards international commercial arbitration, but also useful with
respect to commercial arbitration, more generally).
44
Stephen L. Hayford, Building a More Perfect Beast: Rethinking the Commercial
Arbitration Agreement, 7 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 437, 439 (2009) (explaining parties’
very fundamental desire for “a clear alternative to traditional litigation”).
45
See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 372 (3d ed. 1986) (suggesting
that the law should supply the terms the parties would have adopted had they addressed
43
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agreement also risks the possibility of getting it wrong. In fact, the parties
may perceive that their agreement is fully complete—notwithstanding
apparent gaps.
For example, the parties to an arbitration agreement may have simply
provided for binding arbitration before a single arbitrator chosen by the
parties. While one might suggest that this agreement leaves a rather large
gap with respect to the arbitral procedure, it might also be that the parties
simply intended to grant the arbitrator complete discretion with respect to
procedure.46 If so, then perhaps the agreement does not really include any
gaps at all.
The FAA does not speak directly to this possibility.47 However, the
UNCITRAL Model Law provides a potential indication of the parties’
likely normative views. Article 19(2) provides that an “arbitral tribunal
may, subject to the provisions of [the UNCITRAL Model Law], conduct
the arbitration in such manner as it considers appropriate.”48 One might
reasonably infer that this represents a commercial norm suggesting that the
parties often prefer broad grants of discretion to the arbitrators. However,
this apparently broad grant of authority comes in the context of a very well
developed set of default rules governing many of the most common
procedures likely to arise in arbitral proceedings.49 Thus, it is much more
difficult to draw any inference that parties would typically grant complete
discretion to arbitrators in the absence of any default rules. Moreover, any
exercise of arbitrator discretion presupposes the existence of an arbitrator
to exercise that discretion and, without at least some sort of default rule
regarding the appointment of an arbitrator, effectuation of the parties’
agreement to arbitrate is impossible.50
the issue); Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) (providing the parties with the
term they would have negotiated had they recognized the issue and had the time and
money to address it). But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 90-91 (suggesting that
the most efficient default terms will not always be those the parties would have wanted,
but may sometimes be those that at least one party does not favor).
46
See Alan Scott Rau, Federal Common Law and Arbitral Power, 8 NEV. L.J. 169,
180-81 (2007) (suggesting “unfettered arbitral discretion and control” as the “universally
accepted ‘meta gap-filler’”).
47
See id. Though, one might argue that the FAA speaks indirectly to the issue by
largely omitting any gap fillers. Seemingly, this is Professor Rau’s view in suggesting the
lack of need for specific FAA gap fillers. See id.
48
UNCITRAL Model Law—2006 Amendment, supra note 26, art. 19(2).
49
See, e.g., id. art. 17.
50
One of the very few default rules provided by the FAA is that, if the parties cannot
agree, a court shall appoint an arbitrator. 9 U.S.C § 5 (2006). Court appointment is not,
however, the only option. Many institutional rules provide for appointment by the
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Once an arbitrator has been chosen, the parties may grant that
arbitrator broad authority to decide their dispute on equitable principles
without reference to any particular substantive law.51 This sort of
arbitrator authority might also suggest a broad discretionary norm.
However, arbitral rules addressing the issue require the parties’ express
consent to grant the arbitrator such broad discretionary power over the
substance of their dispute.52 In the same vein, the parties are unlikely to
have intended a grant of virtually unlimited procedural discretion in the
absence of a clear indication of that intent. Thus, the parties’ intentions are
most likely served by default terms reflecting those they would have likely
agreed upon in the event they had addressed the issues in question.
C. What Sort of Default Rules Might Be Appropriate for Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Arbitration Agreements?
The classic “majoritarian” approach to default rules is to seek to
determine the rule that most similarly situated parties would have wanted
had they actually considered and negotiated the issue at the time of
contracting.53 In contrast, one of the most commonly discussed
alternatives is the “penalty” default approach.54 The basic idea of a penalty
default is that the default rule should be designed to be a rule disfavored
by a party likely to possess information useful to its contracting partner.55
The party with the relevant information is, therefore, faced with the option
of either accepting a rule it does not like or disclosing the information.56 In
the case of arbitration agreements, a “majoritarian” approach is likely to
be the most appropriate.
institution. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 8 r.11 (2010); UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, G.A. Res. 31/98,
art. 6, U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976) (providing for
designation of any appointing authority by the Permanent Court of arbitration).
51
See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N & INT’L CTR. FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, INT’L
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 13 art.28(1) (2009).
52
Id. at art.28(3).
53
Joshua Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1441-42 (2009); Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 93.
54
Fairfield, supra note 53; see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97. One of the
classic examples of a penalty default is the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, which provides
that consequential damages are limited by foreseeability. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 150 (1854).
The party contracting for carriage is faced with either accepting a limit on liability for
late delivery or disclosing to its contracting partner information as to the potentially large
losses it might suffer with respect to late delivery. Id. With such information in hand, the
carrier can negotiate over whether it is willing to accept such risks and at what price. Id.
55
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 97.
56
Id.
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Penalty defaults are most appropriate when the ex ante cost of
contracting is relatively cheap.57 However, the cost of contracting for
specific details of an arbitration agreement is likely to be particularly
high.58 Moreover, it seems unlikely that, at the time of contracting, either
party would be strategically withholding information regarding a potential
arbitration process that the other might value in negotiating a more
detailed arbitration agreement.59 A majoritarian approach also seems
particularly appropriate when one looks at commercial arbitration from a
normative perspective.
To a large degree, most business parties to a commercial arbitration
agreement share the same general expectations. In choosing arbitration of
a dispute arising out of a commercial, business-to-business transaction, the
parties are typically interested in the following characteristics:
• Arbitration is generally perceived as faster than litigation
and, at least to the extent it is faster, cheaper than litigation;60
• Arbitration is generally perceived as more flexible and less
adversarial than litigation;
• The parties may choose their decision-maker for his or her
expertise, thereby leading to more accurate outcomes;
• Arbitration is private and largely confidential;61 and
• The decision of the arbitrator is final, thus bringing closure
to the dispute and allowing the parties to return to any remaining
business relationship.62
57

Id. at 93.
See supra Part I.A.
59
At the time of contract conclusion, it seems unlikely that either party would be
sufficiently prescient to know what information it might strategically withhold from the
other or, in contrast, disclose in attempting to negotiate around a disfavored default rule.
60
The cost of the arbitrator makes this aspect of arbitration more expensive than
litigation. However, the speed and efficiency of arbitration are generally thought to more
than compensate for this cost, thus reducing the overall cost of the process. But see
JACKSON WILLIAMS, PUBLIC CITIZEN, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 61-67 (Frank
Clemente et al. eds., 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF11
0A.PDF.
61
The parties may agree upon a confidentiality requirement within the arbitration
proceedings themselves. See, e.g., JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES AND
PROCEDURES 27 r.26(a) (2009). They may also agree upon a requirement that the parties,
the arbitrators, and any institution maintain such confidentiality outside of the
proceedings. See, e.g., LCIA, ARBITRATION RULES, art. 30.1 (1998). However, any such
agreement is subject to required disclosures pursuant to judicial proceedings. JAMS,
supra; LCIA, supra. Thus, the benefit of confidentiality is often lost when parties end up
in court over issues arising out of the arbitration agreement.
58
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When the transaction crosses national borders, the parties to an international commercial arbitration agreement share the same expectations
listed above, but also typically choose arbitration for two additional
reasons:
• Arbitration provides a neutral forum, as compared to
national courts; and
• Arbitration awards are generally easier to enforce in a
national jurisdiction other than that in which they are issued.63
These latter two attributes related to international transactions in no
way conflict with the former list of more general characteristics. Thus,
there is no apparent reason why a set of default rules for domestic
commercial arbitration would necessarily need to be any different from
those suitable for international commercial arbitration.
We can also find significant agreement on those attributes of
arbitration agreements that parties find least attractive, most of which
relate to the increased costs and delay associated with two things: (1) the
increasing tendency of lawyers—especially American lawyers—to turn
arbitration into something that looks very much like litigation;64 and (2)
court proceedings in connection with an arbitration agreement.65 Each of
these concerns can, to some degree, be minimized with an appropriate set
of default rules.66
A regime of default rules for arbitration based on a majoritarian
approach would, therefore, likely include rules providing for a relatively
expeditious, inexpensive, cooperative and flexible means of dispute
62

01.

63

See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 451-52; Kann, supra note 43, at 500-

See, e.g., Drahozal & Ware, supra note 43, at 452; MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra
note 8, at 312-15.
64
See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, International Arbitration Loses Its Grip: Are U.S.
Lawyers to Blame? 96 A.B.A. J. 50, 51 (2010); see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 43839 (pointing out the stark difference between clients’ interest in efficient and cost
effective dispute resolution and the lawyer’s interest in fighting to win every possible
battle irrespective of the costs or effectiveness of doing so).
65
See, e.g., Lou Whiteman, Arbitration’s Fall from Grace, CORPORATE COUNSEL
(July 13, 2006), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1152695125655.
66
The third concern about arbitration is that of the inability to join other parties to the
dispute who are not parties to the arbitration agreement. While some national laws and
institutional rules have begun to address this issue in a limited manner, arbitral
jurisdiction is ultimately based on consent, and, without consent, joinder is likely to
remain a challenge. As such, this issue is not addressed in the context of this default rules
analysis.
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resolution before a neutral expert decision maker; conducted in a private
and confidential setting; and culminating in a final, and fully enforceable
award, deciding the merits of the parties’ dispute, all with as little court
intervention as possible. Admittedly, there are several important variations
on this general theme, and frequent variations are found in institutional
arbitration rules. However, these variations in rules are in no way
inconsistent with the premise that a substantial majority of parties to an
arbitration agreement are looking for the same general characteristics in
resolving their dispute. For example, one might analogize a set of
arbitration rules to the rules of carriage found in standard shipping terms,
such as “Ex Works,” “Free on Board,” or “Cost, Insurance, and Freight.”67
However, the fact that parties may choose terms of carriage that differ on
important issues in no way undermines the value of the default rules found
in uniform sales law, such as Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) Article
2 or the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods.68
In a similar fashion, a set of default rules governing commercial
arbitration would provide a valuable baseline in filling gaps in the parties’
agreement in the absence of any express choice—either directly or by
incorporation.
It is often said that arbitration is based entirely on consent.69 When
business parties fail to contract around a set of established default legal
rules, the parties might reasonably be said to have tacitly consented to
these rules by their silence.70 However, such an inference is only
reasonable if (1) the parties had reason to know of the default rule and (2)
the cost of contracting around the rule is not prohibitive.71 The latter issue,
in particular, presents a problem in the context of an arbitration agreement
because, as discussed earlier, the costs of negotiating an arbitration
agreement may often be unusually high.72 Whether such costs are
sufficiently high to preclude an inference of tacit consent, the issue is at
least a problematic one in terms of inferring consent from silence.
However, even where parties cannot be said to have tacitly consented via
67

International Chamber of Commerce, Incoterms 2010, http://www.iccwbo.org/
incoterms/id3040/index.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) [hereinafter Incoterms 2010].
68
See infra Part II.D for a more developed comparison of default contract terms,
adopted by way of incorporation, with default legal rules, adopted by choosing a
particular seat for the arbitration.
69
CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2003).
70
Barnett, supra note 36, at 826.
71
Id. at 866.
72
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
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silence, the imposition of default legal rules “may still be justified on the
grounds of consent when default rules are chosen to reflect the common
sense or conventional understanding of most parties.”73
In contracting for arbitration, “the parties’ subjective intent is most
likely to be satisfied by a default rule that interprets manifested consent to
reflect the commonsense or conventional expectations that are likely part
of the tacit assumptions of particular parties.”74 Such commonsense
expectations are those normative expectations shared by most people
choosing arbitration for dispute resolution. Thus, where default rules are
based on a strong, majoritarian set of commercial norms, they may be said
to reflect the commonly held consent of the commercial arbitration
community. To some degree, this argument might be made in support of
any set of normative default rules, such as U.C.C. Article 2.75 However,
the normative force of expectations within the arbitration community is
arguably even greater than in most such identifiable transactional
communities, as those common sense expectations tend to be particularly
pervasive within that community. Thus, majoritarian default rules
governing arbitration agreements may be reasonably characterized as
reflecting the general consent of those businesses choosing to resolve their
disputes through arbitration.
The final issue regarding the nature of default rules is the extent to
which such rules might be tailored to the particular circumstances of
specific parties.76 Perhaps one of the most significant choices in dispute
resolution generally and arbitration in particular is the choice between
speed and cost on the one hand and reaching the “correct” decision on the
other. This apparent tension need not necessarily present any conflict at
all, as many disputes can be arbitrated quickly, inexpensively, and
accurately—without sacrificing any of these virtues. However, to the
extent these concerns may sometimes conflict, the parties’ expectations at
the time of contracting may differ depending on the nature of the
transaction subject to resolution of disputes through arbitration. If so, it
may be worth considering whether default rules can be tailored to address
this particular potential difference in expectations.

73

Barnett, supra note 36, at 827.
Id. at 880.
75
Such “common sense” rules might be contrasted with those that would not be part
of the commonsense expectations of most commercial parties. For example, the default
rules regarding the division of partnership profits seem quite contrary to common sense
in many circumstances. Id. at 884.
76
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92 (noting the distinction between tailored
and untailored defaults).
74

2011]

ARBITRATION AS CONTRACT

245

The most significant critique of arbitration today comes from the cost
and delay associated with long, protracted proceedings,77 and the business
community is increasingly calling for a more expeditious, cost effective
process.78 However, in at least some instances, business parties may value
getting the “correct” result over efficiency. Thus, a set of default legal
rules governing arbitration might distinguish between default rules
applicable in expedited arbitration and those applicable in non-expedited
arbitration.79 One option would be to leave this distinction to the
arbitrators to make a determination on a case-by-case basis, depending on
what is “reasonable in the circumstances.”80 While it is difficult to identify
any singular method for distinguishing between the parties’ expectations
in all circumstances, the size of the transaction will often provide a strong
indication.81
In any event, this potential conflict between efficiency and accuracy is
one of the differences between party expectations most likely to lead to a
need for tailored defaults,82 and any set of default legal rules governing
arbitration should consider and address this and any other such issues.
However, the need for a few select, tailored default rules in no way
precludes a largely majoritarian approach to the provision of default legal
rules governing incomplete agreements to arbitrate.
77

Seidenberg, supra note 64, at 51; see also Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39
(noting business decision makers concerns with delay and opportunity costs).
78
See, e.g., Hayford, supra note 44, at 438-39; Peter Morton, Can a World Exist
Where Expedited Arbitration Becomes the Default Procedure? 26 ARB. INT’L 103, 104
(2010).
79
For example—and only by way of example—the former might provide default
rules requiring only a single arbitrator, minimal discovery, and short time frames for
submission of pleadings, while the latter might provide for three arbitrators and greater
opportunity for discovery. One might also suggest, in the latter case, an opportunity for
some sort of substantive appellate review—an option arguably foreclosed under the FAA.
See Hall St. Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008) (holding that the provisions
for review of an arbitrator’s decision under sections 10 and 11 are exclusive).
80
Ayres & Gertner, supra note 37, at 91-92. This approach is used in a variety of
provisions within U.C.C. Article 2. See, e.g., U.C.C § 2-206 (2005) (contract offer
“inviting acceptance” when in manner “reasonable in the circumstances”).
81
See, e.g., THE CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY OF BASEL, BERN, GENEVA,
NEUCHÂTEL, TICINO, VAUD AND ZURICH, SWISS RULES OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
21 art.42 (2006) (providing a default rule for expedited arbitration of disputes of less than
one million Swiss Francs).
82
The Swiss Rules actually contemplate both a discretionary tailored rule based on
the “complexity of the subject matter and/or the amount in dispute.” Id. at 9 art.6(2)
(providing for discretion as to the number of arbitrators), as well as a “bright line”
tailored rule. Id. at 21 art.42(2) (providing for expedited procedures below a certain
amount in dispute).
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In thinking about a set of default legal rules governing arbitration, it is
also worth considering the broader structural framework for such rules.
For this purpose, Article 2 of the U.C.C.,83 as well as the Uniform
Partnership Act (both original and revised),84 provide useful analogies.
D. Arbitration Agreements as Nominate Contracts?
The treatment of sales and partnership as unique and specific forms of
contract goes back to Roman law, where each was treated as a form of
nominate contract, complete with its own set of default provisions.85 The
French Civil Code also treated arbitration as a nominate contract—a
distinction still maintained today in the civil codes of Louisiana and
Quebec.86 In the case of such nominate contracts, a code will necessarily
provide for a default set of rights and obligations, which will govern the
parties’ agreement in the absence of any contrary intent. While the
theoretical underpinnings of traditional civilian nominate contracts and
common law default rules are admittedly distinct, the basic ideas are
sufficiently similar to be worthy of our consideration in drawing possible
analogies. This civil law approach to codification of traditional nominate
contracts is, to some degree, reflected in the U.S. approach to codification
of the law governing the sale of goods and partnerships—two of the oldest
forms of nominate contracts.87 As another traditional form of nominate
contract, arbitration arguably deserves a comparable comprehensive and
systematic approach to codification.
In his campaign for enactment of a uniform commercial code
governing, inter alia, sales of goods, Professor Karl Llewellyn often
pointed to the cost of uncertainty in commercial transactions governed by
common law as being a result of the uncertainty linked with the outcome
being determined by the highest court of the relevant jurisdiction.88
Llewellyn sought to avoid that uncertainty by providing a highly
83

U.C.C. §§ 2-305, -308, -309 (providing default terms for incomplete contracts).
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP
ACT 1 (1997) (stating in the Prefatory Note that the Act is “largely a series of default
rules that govern the relations among partners in situations they have not addressed in a
partnership agreement”), available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/Home_desktop
default.aspx (follow “Final Acts & Legislation” link; then find the act in “Select an Act
Title” box).
85
BARRY NICHOLAS, FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 46 (1982).
86
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-:4217 (2010); Civil Code of Québec, S.Q.
2005, c. 18 (Can.).
87
See supra notes 83-84.
88
Shael Herman, The Fate and the Future of Codification in America, 40 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 407, 428-29 (1996).
84
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structured set of default legal rules governing the parties’ transactions in
the absence of any contrary intent.89 He employed a normative approach to
drafting these rules and weaved the individual provisions together in a
comprehensive and systematic mosaic within which its own fabric often
provides the basis for filling any remaining gaps.90 While perhaps not as
storied as Llewellyn’s drafting of the U.C.C., the uniform laws governing
partnership agreements in this country provide additional examples of
comprehensive and systemic codifications of a specific form of contract
that could otherwise be governed by the common law of contracts.91
As explained more fully below, the same sort of uncertainty Llewellyn
spoke of, over fifty years ago, exists today with arbitration agreements
governed by the FAA—a bare bones statute largely displaced by federal
“common law.”92 Instead of providing a comprehensive and systematic
approach to the law governing arbitration, the FAA relies almost entirely
on the common law of contracts, along with the developing federal
common law governing those unanswered common law of contracts
questions.93 There is no good reason why arbitration contracts do not
deserve the same thoughtful statutory treatment the law provides to other
unique contracts, such as those for the sale of goods or partnership.94
The vast majority of other modern legal systems have done much more
than the United States to develop default legal rules governing
arbitration.95 The UNCITRAL Model Law (adopted, at least in part, by
over fifty countries and seven U.S. states)96 contains a well-developed and
reasonably comprehensive set of default provisions systematically
addressing many of the issues that might arise under an arbitration
agreement that does not incorporate a complete set of private institutional
89

Id. at 429-31.
Id. at 428-29.
91
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
92
Margaret Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How The Supreme Court Created a
Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 99-100
(2006).
93
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (stating that an arbitration agreement is valid “save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
94
One might ask at this stage if arbitration ought to be governed by uniform state law
instead of federal law. In fact, a number of states have adopted either the original
Uniform Arbitration Act or the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act. See infra notes 248 &
257 and accompanying text. However, as more fully explained in Part II.C infra, the use
of state law to cure the current ills of the FAA is fraught with its own set of perils.
95
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26; NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCÉDURE
CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] art. 1442-1507 (Fr.) [hereinafter Arbitration Rules of France];
Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 (Eng.) [hereinafter English Arbitration Act].
96
Status: 1985 UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26.
90
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or ad hoc rules.97 A number of other countries, including France and
England, have their own unique default legal regimes governing
arbitration—somewhat different from the Model Law, but each far more
comprehensive than the FAA.98
Admittedly, not every incomplete contract should be completed by
reference to default rules and not every type of contract requires a
uniquely tailored statutory scheme.99 However, the unique and specialized
nature of an arbitration agreement,100 coupled with a significant body of
strong and well-established commercial norms surrounding such an
agreement,101 would seem to demand a unique and comprehensive statute
governing domestic and international commercial arbitration in this
country.102
II. FILLING THE GAPS: POTENTIAL SOURCES OF DEFAULT RULES
The FAA governs both domestic and international arbitration.103
Domestic arbitration is governed by Chapter 1,104 while international
arbitration is governed by Chapters 2105 and 3.106 The original FAA
(Chapter 1) provides for enforcement of domestic agreements to arbitrate
and grants the parties broad autonomy in structuring such arbitration,107
while providing very few default rules to guide the parties who fail to
exercise that autonomy.108 Therefore, when one is faced with a “gap” in

97
98

95.

99

See generally id.
See Arbitration Rules of France, supra note 95; English Arbitration Act, supra note

See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 59, 67 (1993).
100
See Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 319, 321 (2007).
101
See IAN R. MACNEIL, RICHARD E. SPEIDEL & THOMAS J. STIPANOVICH, FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAW § 7.1.2.1 (1999).
102
This idea is more fully discussed infra, Parts II.B-D.
103
See Szalai, supra note 100, at 325.
104
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
105
Id. §§ 201-208.
106
Id. §§ 301-307.
107
Id. §§ 1-16. While a few new sections have been added to the FAA, such as those
on appeal, 9 U.S.C. § 16, and the legal effect of the statute has arguably changed
significantly through the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. See generally
Moses, supra note 92. The text of the original 1925 statute remains largely unchanged
today.
108
See Moses, supra note 92, at 111-112.
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the details of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, the FAA provides little
guidance in filling that gap.109
Chapter 2 of the FAA addresses foreign and other “non-domestic”
agreements to arbitrate110 and provides for the application of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the New York Convention) to such arbitration agreements and
any resulting awards.111 Chapter 3 of the FAA also addresses foreign and
other “non-domestic” agreements to arbitrate,112 but provides for the
application of the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration (the Panama Convention)113 to arbitration
agreements in which the majority of the parties are citizens of signatory
states to the Panama Convention.114 While Chapters 2 and 3 serve their
intended purposes of giving effect to these respective Conventions, their
interaction with FAA Chapter 1 also raises some issues of uncertainty in
their application.115 In addition the Panama Convention raises a unique
issue because of its adoption of a complete set of default rules of the InterAmerican Arbitration Commission.116
As more fully explained below, this broad, vague attempt at “statutory
dépeçage”117 fails for at least two reasons. First, the overall statute is
insufficiently detailed in providing default provisions.118 Second, many of
the details it does provide in international transactions do not mesh well

109

See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307.
Id. §§ 201-208.
111
Id. § 201; New York Convention, supra note 6, § 201.
112
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307.
113
Id. at § 301. See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7.
114
9 U.S.C. § 305(1) (2006).
115
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248.
116
See 9 U.S.C. § 306(a) (2006); Panama Convention, supra note 7, 1 art.3. See
generally SICE, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Arbitration Commission,
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND OTHER ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION METHODS
(July 1, 1988) [hereinafter IACAC Rules], available at http://www.sice.oas.org/dis
pute/comarb/iacac/rop_e.asp. This incorporation of a complete set of default rules is unique in American arbitration law.
117
“Dépeçage” is the process whereby a single legal relationship may be governed by
different laws. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469-470 (8th ed. 2004). The term seems
appropriate here, where the FAA attempts to apply a collection of separate and
independent legal instruments to govern a single contractual relationship—the agreement
to arbitrate an international commercial dispute.
118
See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 15, at 236.
110
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with the law governing domestic transactions, and the overall structure of
the statute arguably creates as many questions as it resolves.119
A. The Current State of American Federal Law Governing Commercial
Arbitration
Congress enacted the FAA in 1925120 for the specific purpose of
overcoming “centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements121”
and enforcing contracts on an equal basis with other common law
contracts.122 Since that time, the United States Supreme Court has given
broad effect to this purpose in both federal and state courts123 and has
consistently resisted state efforts to limit the enforcement of arbitration
agreements on any grounds other than those applying broadly to any and
all contracts.124 For those favoring arbitration generally as a means of
binding dispute resolution, the FAA would seem to be a resounding
success in achieving its original goal.125 However, the parties to an
arbitration agreement are likely seeking more than just enforceability of
their agreement—they are also likely trying to stay out of court
altogether.126 In this respect, the FAA, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court, and as amended by Congress to accommodate international treaties,
has arguably been far less successful.127
119

See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1248.
Szalai, supra note 100, at 325.
121
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 (1974).
122
Id. at 510-11.
123
See generally Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding the FAA
applies in state courts, as well as federal courts). This was arguably the single most
important decision the Supreme Court has ever issued with respect to the FAA, because it
preempted efforts by the states to regulate arbitration—at least to the extent such efforts
were contrary to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of FAA article 2. Moreover, the
preemption issues left open by Southland and subsequent Supreme Court cases are
largely responsible for the uncertainty surrounding current state laws purporting to
govern certain elements of arbitration. The original Southland decision drew a vigorous
and well reasoned dissent. See id. at 21-36 (O’Connor, J. and Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
At least one justice is still fighting the battle lost in Southland. See, e.g., Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting based on his
view that the FAA does not apply in state court proceedings).
124
See, e.g., Doctor’s Assoc., Inc., v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686-88 (1996).
125
See Moses, supra note 92, at 99-100.
126
See John M. Townsend, Drafting Arbitration Clauses Avoiding the 7 Deadly Sins,
58 DISP. RESOL. J. 28, 31 (2003). Even if court intervention is unnecessary to give effect
to the parties’ arbitration agreement, a party may find it necessary to resort to courts
regarding remedies such as specific relief, which are generally unavailable from the
arbitral tribunal.
127
See, e.g., Moses, supra note 92, at 101.
120
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1. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Minimalist Approach to Domestic
Arbitration Under Chapter 1
The loadstar rule of FAA Chapter 1 is found in section 2,128 which
provides that an agreement “to settle by arbitration a controversy … shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”129 An arbitration
agreement is fully binding as long as: (1) the parties agree in writing to
final and binding arbitration and (2) the dispute in question falls within the
scope of the arbitration agreement.130 Of course, many arbitration
agreements will provide substantially more detail, either within the
arbitration agreement itself, or by way of incorporation of a specific set of
arbitration rules.131 Freedom of contract lies at the heart of commercial
arbitration, with the parties granted broad autonomy in designing their
own mechanism for the resolution of disputes.132 Moreover, parties are
encouraged to exercise this broad autonomy by thoughtfully and carefully
crafting an arbitration regime meeting their specific needs.133 However,
the parties do not always exercise this autonomy in any great detail,134 and
their agreement to arbitrate will be enforced whether or not they provide
such detail.135
For example, the parties to an agreement might provide that “[a]ny
disputes arising out of this Agreement will be finally resolved by binding
arbitration.”136 The parties would almost certainly be bound to resolve
their relevant contract disputes by arbitration.137 However, with such a
minimalist arbitration agreement, they would have to look outside the

128

David Horton, Essay, The Mandatory Core of Section 4 of the Federal Arbitration
Act, 96 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 1, 4 (2010), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2010/04/02/horton.pdf.
129
See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
130
See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1.
131
Id.
132
See Stipanowich, supra note 12, at 405.
133
Id. at 403.
134
See id. at 405.
135
9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
136
Townsend, supra note 126, at 31. Townsend suggests that this clause represents an
extreme example of poor drafting. Id. However, this author has seen many such clauses
in actual contracts drafted by both lawyers and laypeople.
137
Id.
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FAA to ascertain the details of such arbitration.138 In theory, the law
governing the arbitration should supply the default provisions necessary to
fill any gaps.139 Unfortunately for the arbitrating parties, the FAA provides
very little guidance in this respect.140
In comparison with most modern arbitration statutes, the FAA is a
“bare-bones statute directed primarily at insuring that courts give effect to
arbitration clauses and awards, and prescribes no significant procedural
standards.”141 The FAA simply fails to answer many of the questions
essential to the conduct of arbitration proceedings.142 As such, if the
parties fail to answer these questions in their original agreement and
cannot do so after the dispute has arisen, the questions all too often end up
in court, thus arguably defeating the parties’ original purpose in agreeing
to arbitrate in the first place.143
Whatever one may think of the FAA, it would seem, beyond any
rational argument to the contrary, that Chapter 1 does not itself fulfill any
significant role in filling “gaps” by way of default rules.144 Thus, our next
question is whether such gaps may reasonably be filled by the courts,145 by
138

Id. Of course, the parties could agree, after the dispute had arisen, to conduct the
arbitration in a particular manner or according to a particular set of rules. However, it is
common knowledge that, once a dispute has arisen, it is often difficult to get parties in an
adversarial posture to agree on anything. For purposes of the foregoing analysis, I will
assume that the parties are unable to reach consensus on any of the pertinent issues.
139
See MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 101, at § 7.1.2.1; see also ALAN REDFERN &
MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION §
3-42 (Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. eds., 4th ed. 2004) (explaining that, in international
commercial arbitration, gaps are filled by reference to the governing arbitration law—
typically that of the place of arbitration); Carbonneau, supra note 15, at 418 (pointing out
that many of the procedural details of arbitration—about which the parties may
disagree—can be resolved by reference to the law governing the arbitration, to the extent
not addressed by the parties’ agreement).
140
See Drahozal, New Experiences of International Commercial Arbitration, supra
note 15, at 236.
141
Id. (quoting Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition and Innovation in
International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 89, 90 n.3 (1995)).
142
See id. at 238.
143
One of the greatest criticisms of arbitration today is the fact that parties bargaining
for arbitration end up in court attempting to enforce their agreement. See, e.g., Whiteman,
supra note 65, at 1 (explaining that “[o]ur company ended up investing more than a
year’s worth of time and substantial legal fees simply to enforce in court our right not to
have to go to court”). It is worth considering at this juncture that a positive agreement to
arbitrate is also, to a large degree, a negative agreement to stay out of court. As such, a
need to resort to court in order to conduct the agreed upon arbitration proceedings would
seem anathema to a basic agreement to arbitrate. This issue is explored more fully infra
Part II.B.
144
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
145
See infra Part II.B.
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state law,146 or by arbitration rules.147 Each of these will be addressed in
turn below. However, before leaving the FAA behind, a few final issues
are worth noting.
2. The Federal Arbitration Act: The Rest of Chapter 1
While the primary focus of this Article is default legal rules, this
Article will also address a few other key legal rules under FAA Chapter 1,
some of which are mandatory.148 While this Article ultimately suggests
that the FAA be fully replaced—not amended—certain of these additional
provisions are important to understanding other attempts to “fill the gaps”
in the parties’ agreement, as well as some of the other challenges
presented by the existing legal structure.
FAA sections 3 and 4 provide for motions in federal court to stay any
pending court action or compel the parties to arbitrate a dispute subject to
a valid arbitration agreement under section 2.149 One might reasonably
read section 4 as providing a mandatory rule that the court must determine
whether the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement and whether
the dispute is within its scope.150 However, the Supreme Court has
apparently held otherwise, ruling that this is merely a default rule, which
the parties may displace if they would prefer to grant the arbitrators
jurisdiction to make these threshold decisions as to their own jurisdiction
over the merits of the dispute.151 This issue is more fully explored in Part
II.E below.152
Assuming that the parties’ agreement mandates arbitration of the
dispute in question, the next potentially relevant provisions are those applicable to the proceedings themselves.153 Section 5 provides a default rule
for appointment of arbitrators where one of the parties refuses to cooperate
146

See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
148
Most provisions of Chapter 1, including section 2, rely entirely on party consent
and are, therefore, subject to the parties’ right to override them—provided, of course, that
the parties can agree. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
149
Id. §§ 3-4.
150
See generally Horton, supra note 128 (claiming that section 4 is mandatory).
151
See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (explaining
in dicta that “the question ‘who has the primary power to decide arbitrability’ turns upon
what the parties agreed about that matter” (emphasis in original)); Rent-A-Center, W.,
Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, n.1 (2010) (applying the First Options dicta to a “clear
and unmistakable” delegation of this decisional power to the arbitrator).
152
See infra Part II.E.
153
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 5-16.
147
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in constituting the panel.154 The court is to make the appointment
consistent with the parties’ agreement, or, in the absence of any
agreement, choose a single arbitrator.155 The statute does not, however,
provide any guidance as to how the court might go about exercising such a
choice.156
Section 7 provides for court assistance in enforcing a subpoena issued
by an arbitration panel.157 However, Chapter 1 contains nothing more
concerning the actual conduct of the arbitration from the time the tribunal
is constituted through its issuance of a final award,158 which brings us to
the last set of issues—those arising after an award has been issued.
Section 9 provides for confirmation of an award: the process by which
a private award is transformed into an enforceable public judgment.159
This section provides a time limit for confirmations, a notice requirement,
and jurisdiction, but otherwise mandates that an award shall be confirmed
absent grounds for vacation under section 10, or modification or
correction under section 11.160 Section 10 provides a narrow set of
grounds for vacation, which might reasonably be summarized as
mandating an arbitration process that comports with due process; is
untainted by fraud, corruption, or bias; and is ultimately derived from the
consent of the parties,161 while section 11 provides for modification or
correction of certain clerical mistakes or issues in which the arbitrators
went beyond the consent of the parties.162 Lastly, appeals of lower court
decisions at any stage of the process are addressed by section 16, which
generally makes decisions contrary to arbitration subject to immediate
appeal,163 while decisions favorable to arbitration may not be appealed
until the process is complete through confirmation or vacation.164
Thus, we might reasonably summarize the key elements of FAA
Chapter 1 by breaking down the governing law into three parts: (1) “front
end” issues as to whether the dispute is subject to arbitration; (2)
“arbitration procedure” issues involving actual arbitral process, from the
constitution of the tribunal through the issuance of a final award; and (3)
“back end” issues involving modification, confirmation, vacation, and/or
154

Id. § 5.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. § 7.
158
See generally id. §§ 1-16.
159
Id. § 9. A motion for confirmation must be made within one year.
160
Id.
161
Id. § 10.
162
Id. § 11.
163
Id. § 16(a).
164
Id. § 16(b).
155
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enforcement of the award.165 Along with the basic enforceability
provisions found in section 2,166 the only significant additional front end
rule is the default rule reflected in sections 3 and 4 that courts determine
whether the arbitrators have jurisdiction to hear the basic dispute.167 FAA
Chapter 1 has only two significant default rules on arbitration procedure—
one regarding the appointment of an arbitrator and one providing
arbitrators with the power to subpoena witnesses.168
Most of the back end issues involve mandatory rules, and FAA
Chapter 1 provides an appropriately limited set of bases for vacation,
modification, or correction.169 These bases for vacation in section 10
present other challenges, which will be addressed later in this part, as well
as Part II.E infra.170
Notably, each of the above default rules involves direct resort to the
courts, and the rule regarding appointment of arbitrators provides no
guidance for a court in fulfilling its duties. Instead of providing default
provisions defining the rights and obligations of the parties and thereby
filling any gaps in their agreement, FAA Chapter 1 simply sends the
parties to the courts to resolve the issue—assuming it addresses the issue
at all.171 This approach is seemingly at odds with the most basic idea of
arbitration—the resolution of the parties’ dispute without resort to the
courts.
The default rule that courts determine whether the parties have agreed
to arbitration says nothing about which of these threshold jurisdictional
issues should be determined by a court and which should be determined by
the arbitrators.172 As a result, this has been an often litigated issue, in some
165

While one might reasonably break arbitration law down in a variety of ways, this
Article will take what is, essentially, the same approach as the drafters of the Revised
Uniform Arbitration Act. See RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note pp. 2-3, 5
(alluding to “front end” issues, “back end” issues, and “purely procedural dimensions of
the arbitration process”).
166
9 U.S.C. § 2.
167
See Szalai, supra note 100, at 326.
168
See generally 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
169
Id. §§ 10-11. For purposes of this Article, I will omit further reference to section
16 on appeals, inasmuch as I do not believe its content is necessarily affected by the
issues raised below.
170
Id. § 10.
171
Id. §§ 10-11.
172
Id. §§ 3-4. This is not a single, unitary decision. By way of example, here are just a
few of the questions that might arise: Did the parties agree to arbitrate anything? Is the
instant dispute within the scope of the parties’ agreement to arbitrate? Is the contract
containing the arbitration clause itself voidable or void (the separability issue)? Is the
dispute subject to arbitration at all, or is it one that must be heard by courts based on
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cases reaching the Supreme Court.173 Again, this issue is explored more
fully in Part II.E below.174
The FAA also says nothing about its application in state courts. While
the Supreme Court has, since 1984, unequivocally stated that section 2
applies in state courts,175 the preemptive effects of the remainder of Chapter 1 are far less certain. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2,
coupled with the express language of sections 3 and 4, would seem to
produce the odd result that the FAA governs actions in state court, but
such actions cannot be removed to federal court absent diversity
jurisdiction.176 The open issues involving preemption beyond section 2
call into serious question the relevance of state arbitration statutes that
purport to govern many of the same issues addressed by the FAA, as well
as many issues to which the FAA does not speak. This convoluted
example of federalism gone haywire is explored further in Part II.C below.
At this point, it is sufficient to say that FAA Chapter 1 leaves some “front
end” issues in a state that is unnecessarily complicated and, in some cases,
unresolved.
There is little case law on FAA “arbitration procedure,” which is
hardly surprising in view of the lack of FAA content addressing such
issues. An exemplary case in this area involved the potential applicability
of California state arbitration law, which provided for a stay of arbitration
under certain circumstances, pending the outcome of related court
proceedings.177 The outcome of this case presented anything but a clear
picture with respect to the applicability of state law in any but the most
clear-cut of circumstances.178
While the FAA itself appears reasonably clear with respect to “back
end” issues, the courts have, nonetheless, fashioned their own additional
non-statutory grounds for vacating arbitration awards—the most notorious
being “manifest disregard of the law.”179 Again, the extent of FAA preemption is uncertain and inconsistently applied by the courts.
public policy? Have the parties complied with any preconditions to arbitration, such as a
mediation process that might be contractually required beforehand? Are each of the
putative parties to the arbitration actually parties to the agreement to arbitrate?
173
See, e.g., Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
174
Infra Part II.E.
175
Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
176
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4. These statutes, by their express language apply only in federal
court, and FAA Chapter 1 does not provide for federal question jurisdiction.
177
Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
178
See infra note 280.
179
See Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration, supra note 8, at 1249-51.
But see Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008) (arguably
eliminating the manifest disregard standard).
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At bottom, FAA Chapter 1 does a very effective job of making
arbitration agreements enforceable; however, what it gives with one hand,
it takes away with the other. While arbitration agreements are generally
enforced, the process of enforcing and executing those agreements all too
often leads the parties right back to court to fight about issues that have
nothing to do with their original contract dispute.180 It is no wonder that
businesses are increasingly becoming frustrated with arbitration, as they
end up “in a costly, protracted court battle over an issue that, by contract,
never should have ended up in court at all.”181
3. The Federal Arbitration Act, Chapters 2 and 3: A Schizophrenic
Approach to Default Rules in International Arbitration?
The plot thickens as we move from domestic arbitration under FAA
Chapter 1 to international arbitration under Chapters 2 and 3. In theory,
Chapters 2 and 3182 were simply intended to implement the New York
Convention183 and the Panama Convention184 in the context of foreign
arbitration agreements and awards under the FAA.185 FAA Chapter 1
would still, however, apply to arbitration within the scope of either
convention, unless in conflict with Chapter 2 or 3, or the relevant convention.185 Inasmuch as both the New York and Panama Conventions deal
primarily with enforcement of foreign arbitration agreements and awards,
one might reasonably expect Chapters 2 and 3 to have little effect on
arbitration conducted in the United States. We will see, however, that the
provisions of these chapters have additional effects as well—at least some
of which were not likely intended by the drafters.
a. Arbitration Under the New York Convention
Chapter 2 applies to arbitration agreements falling under the New
York Convention—a convention that has been ratified by 145 countries.186
180

See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
Whiteman, supra note 65.
182
9 U.S.C. §§ 201, 301 (2006).
183
See generally New York Convention, supra note 6.
184
See generally Panama Convention, supra note 7.
185
FAA sections 201 and 301 are central to their respective chapters, inasmuch as
they each provide for enforcement of the respective conventions. See MACNEIL ET AL.,
supra 101, at § 44.8.3.1 (1999).
185
Id.
186
Status: 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, UNCITRAL: U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW [hereinafter Status: 1958
181
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The application of the New York Convention is not, however, limited to
awards made in foreign states. It also applies to awards that are not
considered as domestic awards in the state where their recognition and
enforcement are sought.187 FAA section 202 makes clear that any award
that involves a foreign party or foreign property, or envisages foreign
performance or enforcement is non-domestic—even if the arbitration takes
place in the United States and is governed by United States law.188 Thus,
Chapter 2 would apply, for example, to a transaction between United
States parties that simply envisaged some foreign performance or potential
enforcement against foreign assets. This broad definition of non-domestic
awards solves one problem, but creates another.
Section 203 provides federal question jurisdiction for all actions
falling under the New York Convention, including all non-domestic
awards, as defined in Section 202.189 As a result, the problem with the lack
of federal question jurisdiction under Chapter 1190 disappears under
Chapter 2. To the extent that either party wishes to avail itself of the
federal courts in enforcing the provisions of Chapter 2, removal is
available191—irrespective of diversity. Thus, the federal jurisdictional
complexities associated with Chapter 1 are avoided. However, arbitration
agreements subject to Chapter 2 remain subject as well to the provisions of
Chapter 1, to the extent not in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2
and the New York Convention.192
For example, section 206 provides for the appointment of arbitrators
by a court, pursuant to the parties’ agreement, but says nothing about such
appointment in the absence of agreement.193 Presumably, a court would
simply look to section 5 of Chapter 1 for such authority194 as a residual
supplement fully consistent with both Chapter 2 and the New York
Convention; however, this overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 gives rise to
potential inconsistencies in standards for setting aside or enforcing awards.
Convention]
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html
(last visited Feb. 22, 2011).
187
New York Convention, supra note 6, at art. I(1).
188
9 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
189
Id. § 203.
190
See supra text accompanying note 176.
191
9 U.S.C. § 205. Venue is also provided for in 9 U.S.C. § 204.
192
Id. § 208.
193
Id. § 206; John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and Its Implementation
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 1, 90 (2000) (noting that
section 206 addresses appointment only pursuant to the parties’ agreement, thus
necessitating resort to section 5 in the absence of any agreement).
194
See 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2009).
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Chapter 1 provides standards for both confirmation of an award195 and
setting aside of an award.196 However, these standards are somewhat
different than those for enforcement contained in the New York
Convention and those for set-aside contained in most modern arbitration
laws.197 As a result, the standards for set-aside and enforcement may
differ, depending on the application of section 10 (and perhaps section 11)
to awards governed by the New York Convention.198 The proper answer to
this issue is anything but clear.
Under Chapter 1, section 9, an award is subject to “confirmation” (i.e.,
can be made enforceable) unless subject to being vacated, modified, or
corrected under sections 10 or 11,199 thus seemingly applying the same
standards to both set-aside (or vacation) and enforcement (or
confirmation) under Chapter 1; however, Chapter 2, section 207, provides
for “confirmation” unless an award would be subject to non-enforcement
under the New York Convention200— again, a different set of standards
than those contained in Chapter 1, section 10.201 If courts interpreting
Chapter 2 were interested in harmonizing the standards for setting aside
and enforcing awards, they might reasonably read section 207 broadly and
apply these same bases for non-enforcement to actions to set aside an
award governed by Chapter 2. Alas, they generally do not,202 so a legal
action addressing the viability of an award may be governed by different
standards, depending on whether it is styled as a “confirmation” action or
195

A private arbitration award is made enforceable through court confirmation
proceedings.
196
An award vacated or set aside by a court with proper jurisdiction is rendered a
nullity for most purposes.
197
In contrast, Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration provides for set aside provisions that essentially mirror the bases for nonenforcement contained in Article V of the New York Convention. MORRISSEY & GRAVES
supra note 8, at 462. This was done intentionally in an effort to harmonize the limited
bases for non-enforcement, whether applied in the context of a set aside proceeding or an
enforcement proceeding. See Pieter Sander, The History of the New York Convention, in
IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS 11, 13 (Albert
Jan Van Den Berg ed., 1999).
198
For a more thorough examination of the inherent issues arising from the overlap
between Chapters 1 and 2, see generally Jarred Pinkston, Toward a Uniform
Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act: The Role of 9 U.S.C. § 208 in the Arbitral
Statutory Scheme, 22 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 639 (2008).
199
9 U.S.C. § 9.
200
Id. § 207.
201
Bowman, supra note 193, at 98, 107.
202
See, e.g., Jacada (Eur.), Ltd. v. Int’l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 401 F.3d 701, 712 (6th
Cir. 2005).
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an action to “set aside” the award. The difference may be particularly
dramatic to the extent a party may seek to have an award set aside based
on the “manifest disregard” standard.203
This inconsistency in set-aside and enforcement standards arising from
the overlap between Chapters 1 and 2 is a perfect example of the problems
with piecemeal amendment of the FAA and the reasons why a
comprehensive new statute governing domestic and international
commercial arbitration is necessary. In addition to the same
inconsistencies presented by Chapter 2,204 Chapter 3 also presents its own
unique challenge based on its overlap with Chapter 1.

203

This standard is unique to U.S. law, albeit considerably less certain in application
after the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Hall Street. Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552
U.S. 576, 584-85 (2008). Circuit courts have split on the question of whether the
“manifest disregard” basis for setting aside an arbitral award survived the Court’s
decision in this case. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85,
93-94 (2nd Cir. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding that the
doctrine has survived, but noting the contrary view of the First Circuit, and then finding
that the standard was not satisfied in the instant case). In reversing the Second Circuit
decision, the Supreme Court analyzed the arbitration panel’s decision under section
10(a)(4) of the FAA, instead of the manifest disregard standard. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct.
at 1767-68. However, the Court specifically declined to address the question of whether
“manifest disregard” had survived Hall Street, while simultaneously noting that this
standard was also satisfied in the instant case. Id. at 1768 n 3. In any event, the Second
Circuit continues to consider the doctrine a viable one. See Matthew v. Papua New
Guinea, No. 10-0074, 2010 WL 3784198, at *1-*2 (2d Cir. Sept. 30, 2010) (explaining
when use of the “manifest disregard” standard would be appropriate but ultimately
finding that “that the Arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law”).
In providing its reasoning for continued use of the “manifest disregard” standard, the
Second Circuit held in its original Stolt-Nielen decision that the doctrine was unaffected
by the Court’s limitation of review to FAA section 10, because it believed the “manifest
disregard” doctrine to be grounded in sections 10(a)(3) and 10(a)(4). Stolt-Nielsen, 548
F.3d at 94-95. Section 10(a)(3) has no direct corollary under the New York Convention,
and, while Article V1(c) of the Convention bears some similarities to FAA section
10(a)(4), it would be difficult, if not impossible, to find any serious suggestion that
Article V1(c) included the sort of “manifest disregard” standard applied under the FAA.
204
Much of Chapter 2, including section 207, is incorporated into Chapter 3, and the
Inter-American Convention provisions on non-enforcement are identical to those
contained in the New York Convention. Thus, cases governed by Chapter 3 must address
this same inconsistency between standards for set aside and enforcement. See, e.g., Banco
de Seguros Del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 684-85
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys. Info.
Techs., Inc., No. 02 Civ. 9369, 2003 WL 23641529, at *5, *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2003).
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b. Arbitration Under the Panama Convention and
Incorporation of a Fully Developed Set of Default Rules

Its

Chapter 3 provides for the application of the Panama Convention to
the same categories of arbitration agreements governed by Chapter 2, but
differs in that it only applies when a majority of the parties to the
arbitration agreement are from signatories to the Panama Convention.205
The Panama Convention has been ratified by a significant number of
states within the Americas (including the United States),206 and will
generally govern arbitration involving parties from two of these states or
arbitration relating to a transaction that contemplates performance or
enforcement outside of the United States.207 Thus, it has a potentially
widespread application to arbitration agreements.208
The Panama Convention is, to some degree, less complete than the
New York Convention, thus potentially requiring greater supplementation
via Chapter 1—with one major exception: Article 3 of the Panama
Convention provides for the application of the Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (IACAC) in the
absence of an express agreement by the parties.209 “The practical effect of
this provision is to supply a great deal of arbitration ‘law’ through the

205

9 U.S.C. § 305.
Argentina, Boliva, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Domincan Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United
States, Uruguay, and Venezuela have all ratified the treaty. Multilateral Treaties: InterAmerican Convention on International Commercial Arbitration Signatories and
Ratifications, ORG. OF AM. STATES, DEP’T OF INT’L LAW, http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/b-35.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
207
In fact, based on the statutory language of 9 U.S.C. § 202 (incorporated into
Chapter 3 by § 302), read in combination with § 305, an arbitration agreement in a
contract between two U.S. businesses, which contemplated performance or potential
enforcement abroad—even in a country not a signatory to the Panama Convention (e.g.,
in Germany, China, or Australia)—would be subject to Chapter 3 and the Panama
Convention. Although an enforcement action governed by the Panama Convention makes
little sense if enforcement is likely in a country not a signatory, there is no fundamental
reason why an arbitration proceeding between two U.S. businesses contemplating
performance in Germany could not be governed by Chapter 3 of the FAA. The author is
not aware of any court or commentator who has addressed this issue, but it represents yet
another anomaly arising from the piecemeal drafting of the FAA.
208
For a more thorough examination than that provided herein, see generally
Bowman, supra note 193 (distinguishing the Panama Convention from the New York
Convention).
209
Panama Convention, supra note 7, art. 3.
206
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Commission rules unless the parties otherwise provide.”210 These rules are
essentially identical to the original UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.211
Currently, it may be worthwhile at this stage to recall the difference
between a national law governing arbitration and a set of rules contractually agreed upon by the parties by incorporating these rules into their
agreement. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration is a modern law governing international commercial
arbitration, while the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules represent a set of
rules typically incorporated by parties seeking ad hoc arbitration,212 and
sometimes used as a model for institutional arbitration rules.213 However,
there is nothing precluding the use of a private set of rules, such as the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as the basis for a legislatively enacted set
of default legal rules, as apparently enacted in the case of FAA Chapter 3.
In fact, private rules and legal rules address many of the same issues214—
especially those default rules characterized in Part II.A.2, above, as
“arbitration procedure” issues, but also sometimes including those
characterized as “front end” issues.215 It is the latter group of default legal
rules governing “front end” issues that present perhaps the most
interesting conflict between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.
The bulk of these “front end” issues arises when the parties are unable
to agree upon the appointment of an arbitrator. As explained above in Part
II.A.2, FAA Chapter 1 sends the parties to court for appointment of the
arbitrator.216 In contrast, the IACAC Rules provide for appointment of an
arbitrator by the IACAC, thereby avoiding any need to resort to court
210

MACNEIL, ET. AL., supra note 101, § 44.8.2.
Bowman, supra note 193, at 29. The only meaningful difference is the designation
of IACAC as the appointing authority in the event that the parties are unable to agree on
an arbitrator. See UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, supra note 50, at art. 6. Under the
UNCITRAL Rules, an appointing authority is designated by the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in The Hague. Id.
212
This is arbitration under a specified set of rules, but without designating an
institution for purposes of administering the arbitration. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES,
supra note 8, at 35.
213
See generally, Arbitration Rules of the Chicago International Dispute Resolution
Association, CHICAGO INT’L DISPUTE RESOLUTION ASS’N (July 1, 2005), http://cidra.org/
arbrules (providing a list of these rules).
214
The rules agreed upon by the parties, by way of incorporation, of course take
precedence over any default legal rules, just as any specific provisions of the arbitration
agreement, itself, take precedence over the incorporated rules.
215
“Back end” issues are rarely addressed in private “rules,” as these more typically
involve mandatory rather than default legal rules, such as the legal standards for set-aside
and enforcement. Inasmuch as the parties have no power to vary such legal rules, there is
little point in adding them to a set of private rules to be incorporated by the parties.
216
9 U.S.C. § 5 (2006).
211
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proceedings.217 Thus, the default legal rule applicable under Chapter 3—
by virtue of the application of the Panama Convention and its
incorporation of the IACAC Rules—fundamentally differs from the
default legal rule applicable under Chapter 1 on the question of
appointment of an arbitrator in the absence of party agreement.218 This
difference is fundamental because it reflects a basic difference between
United States law and modern arbitration law with respect to court
involvement in front end issues. United States law reserves “front end”
issues for the courts,219 while many modern national laws and private rules
grant considerable authority to the arbitrators or private institutions to
address many of these “front end” issues.
In particular, the vast majority of modern arbitration laws grant
arbitrators the authority to determine their own jurisdiction under the
doctrine of competence-competence.220 However, FAA Chapter 1 does
not. As explained in Part II.A.2, section 4 provides that the basic
jurisdictional question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate must be
decided by the court.221 While the United States Supreme Court has now
seemingly clarified that the parties may contractually grant the arbitral
tribunal the power to decide its own jurisdiction,222 such a contractual
right is not equivalent to a statutory grant of competence-competence.223
Thus, the incorporation of the IACAC Rules via the recognition of the
Panama Convention in Chapter 3 is quite significant, because Article 21 of
these rules provides for competence-competence.224

217

See Bowman, supra note 193, at 32 (pointing out the positive practical effect of
reducing the need for judicial intervention and the costly delay often associated with such
proceedings).
218
The author is unaware of any court attempting to address this issue under Chapter
3. However, other decisions applying Chapter 3 give considerable cause for skepticism.
See infra note 225.
219
See RUAA, supra note 28, pp. 9-31, 35-49 §§ 2-8, 10-14 (including reference to
involvement of courts in “front-end” issues in specified sections).
220
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, art. 16.
221
See supra Part II.A.2.
222
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010); see First Options of
Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-43 (1995).
223
The problem is largely one of circularity. Under a contractual approach to
competence-competence, any power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
must come from the agreement to arbitrate itself. In contrast, a statutory grant of
competence-competence is not dependent on the parties’ agreement, thus, to at least some
degree, avoiding this problem of circularity. The significant problems with contractual
competence-competence are more fully addressed infra Part II.D.
224
IACAC Rules, supra note 116, art. 21(1) and (2).
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By incorporating Article 21, FAA Chapter 3 has effectively provided
for statutory competence-competence, a provision quite typical in modern
arbitration law outside of the U.S., but quite unique in U.S. arbitration law.
Unfortunately, this “uniqueness” has apparently led at least one court to
fail miserably in its attempt to interpret and apply FAA Chapter 3 and its
incorporation of the IACAC Rules.225 In fairness, the problem faced by
courts attempting to interpret and apply Chapters 2 and 3 of the FAA is
one of attempting to reconcile substantially different bodies of arbitration
law on a number of fundamental issues. Under such circumstances,
perhaps it should not be surprising that courts are often not up to the
challenge.
Ultimately, the FAA provides solid footing for the enforcement of
arbitration agreements to the extent the parties provide the details of such
agreements. However, the FAA provides little more than bare skeletal
provisions beyond its basic pro-enforcement bias. Moreover, the
integration of the original act with the enabling legislation supporting the
enforcement of the relevant international conventions has added further
challenges and confusion to the growing common law body of United
States arbitration law.226
One suggested solution to the current confusion and inconsistencies
found in United States law governing international commercial arbitration

225

See Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Parra, 25 F. Supp. 2d 467, 475-76 (Del. 1998) (giving
effect to section 4 of Chapter 1 over the incorporation of Article 21 of the IACAC Rules
under Chapter 3). The court first determined, somewhat inexplicably, that case law under
FAA Chapter 1 was not “in conflict” with the Panama Convention. Id. at 475. Thus, the
provisions of Chapter 1 were not superseded by Chapter 3. It is hard to see how one could
support such an assertion, and the court does not. However, its analysis is also interesting
for its remarkable preference for case law over a clear and unambiguous statutory
provision. The court goes on to suggest that a statute should not be read to differ from a
common law result, absent a clear and unequivocal imperative required from the nature
of the enactment. Id. at 476. Finding no express intent to change the common law
(notwithstanding the express intent in Chapter 3 to give effect to the Panama
Convention), the court declines to give effect to the clear and unequivocal language of
Chapter 3, the Panama Convention, and the IACAC Rules. Finally, the court seemingly
characterizes FAA Chapter 1, section 4, as a mandatory rule of law (citing Article 1(2) of
the IACAC Rules, which states that such rules are subject to mandatory rules of law),
while simultaneously citing First Options, which clearly suggests that section 4 is not a
mandatory rule of law, but one that even parties can contract around. Id. at 476; see also
Bowman, supra note 193, at 140-49 (providing its own critical analysis of the court’s
decision).
226
George A. Bermann, Restating the U.S. Law of International Commercial
Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 175, 176 (2009) (noting commercial arbitration
is “an area of the law needing clarification”).
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is a new “restatement” of this law.227 Normally, the idea of “restating” a
statute would seem to be logically inconsistent with the basic nature of a
statute.228 In this case, however, the very idea of “restating” the United
States law governing international commercial arbitration demonstrates
the inadequacy of the current statutory scheme—as a statute. In effect, this
obsolete, inadequate, and often inconsistent statute has largely been
displaced by federal common law.229 Thus, it might be useful to ask the
more basic question of whether any arbitration—domestic or
international—should be governed by common law.
B. Gap Filling Under Federal Law by Courts or Legislators: Is It Time To
Amend or Replace the FAA, or Should We Leave the Job to the Courts?
Many of the gaps in the FAA have been filled by court decisions,
including numerous decisions of the Supreme Court. In fact, these
Supreme Court decisions have seemingly left the actual language and
intent of the statute far behind.230 As a result, what we have today is
arguably a body of federal common law governing arbitration. Assuming
one agrees with this assertion, one might next reasonably ask whether this
is a good thing.
Professor Rau acknowledges that arbitration in the United States is
governed today by federal common law,231 but suggests this common law
227

Id. (arguing the publishing of the new Restatement in this area will clarify aspects
of U.S. arbitration law and judicial precedents).
228
The author is by no means questioning the need to do “something” to improve the
current state of the law in this area or the qualifications of the extraordinary group of
individuals assigned to perform the task, but simply the concept of “restating” law
purportedly governed by a statute. For example, it seems unlikely that anyone would ever
suggest a “restatement” of the law governing the sale of goods, because sales of goods
are governed in the United States by U.C.C. Article 2, unless displaced in certain crossborder transactions by the CISG—each fully developed coherent statutes.
229
It is this odd mix of statutory metamorphosis in conjunction with international
conventions—now largely overtaken by federal common law—that gives rise to the need
for such a restatement. Notably, restating the law governing international commercial
arbitration is apparently proving to be an unexpectedly difficult task. See Bermann, supra
note 226, at 175 (noting “already a number of difficult, and to some extent unexpectedly
difficult, questions have arisen” in the development of a restatement).
230
See Moses, supra note 92, at 99.
231
See Rau, supra note 46, at 202. In effect, Professor Rau suggests that, by definition, a common law statute can never contain a “gap” inasmuch as such gaps are filled
by decisional common law. Id. Thus, apparently, the “bare-bones” FAA is fully fleshed
out if we simply know how to view it properly. Of course, it could also be said that any
civil law statute, by definition, contains no gaps, inasmuch as any apparent gaps are
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approach provides good reasons to leave the FAA alone rather than amend
it.232 Rau acknowledges some of the standard rationales one hears in
opposition to amending the FAA, including the notion that any attempt to
tinker in any way with the FAA will open the proverbial “Pandora’s box”
of various special interests and vexing issues.233 But Rau focuses primarily
on his asserted belief that courts are more likely than legislators to “get it
right” and provides numerous examples of what he believes to be
particularly grievous examples of proposed statutory solutions to various
issues arising in arbitration.234
This focus on poor drafting and flawed reasoning might miss the mark.
After all, it is likely that even Professor Rau would acknowledge the
plethora of badly reasoned and poorly drafted court decisions on
arbitration—though perhaps suggesting that a bad court decision is easier
to fix than a bad statute. Presumably, one can find excellent examples of
both judicial and statutory draftsmanship if one looks in the right places,
and this is arguably the aspirational standard. If so, then this might lead
one to ask if there is some basis other than institutional competence for
determining whether arbitration ought to be governed by a comprehensive
statute or a comprehensive body of common law cases.
On this point, Professor Rau explains his basic preference for the
common law, as an incremental and dynamic means of developing the
law,235 and one could debate this question at length based on the relative
advantages and disadvantages of common law versus statutory legal
regimes.236 However, it is important to remember that this is a very
specific sort of contract—an agreement to resolve disputes by
arbitration—and not by court adjudication. As such, it would seem that the
parties’ intent ought to inform the determination of an appropriate legal
regime.
At a bare minimum, the parties to a binding arbitration agreement have
expressed their intent to resolve their dispute through final and binding
arbitration. Assuming that the arbitration agreement says nothing more, it
can, at the very least, be inferred that these same parties intended not to go
simply filled by looking to the general principles underlying the statutory enactment.
However, that misses the issue, which is whether the actual express provisions of the
FAA are sufficiently well developed to provide useful guidance as a set of default legal
rules governing arbitration.
232
Id. at 169.
233
Id. at 170.
234
Id. at 169-82.
235
See id. at 199, 202-03 (showing support for the common law as a principled and
accretional method for developing law).
236
One might even go further with this analysis by comparing common law and civil
law based legal systems.
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to court.237 Thus, the very idea of using appellate court cases to construct a
body of law to govern their relationship is antithetical to the notion of
arbitration. Certainly, there will always be parties who overreach in
attempting to take a dispute to arbitration when it belongs in the courts,
and there will always be recalcitrant parties who attempt to avoid
arbitration—notwithstanding an earlier agreement to use it for dispute
settlement. Courts will also likely remain necessary for certain forms of
specific relief.238 However, these occasions on which the parties must
resort to the courts should be the exceptions, and they certainly should not
be the lifeblood of the law governing an agreement not to go to court.
Professor Rau correctly points out that arbitration is ultimately based
on the consent of the parties.239 As such, the parties’ consent to arbitration
must, at some point, be subject to judicial determination if disputed.240
However, this determination need not be required as a threshold matter (or
even necessarily permitted as a full judicial determination) prior to the
constitution of the tribunal and completion of the full arbitral process—
including a jurisdictional determination by the arbitrators.241 Moreover,
237

A positive choice of final and binding arbitration is also a negative rejection of
court adjudication. Cf. Julian Lew, Does National Court Involvement Undermine the
International Arbitration Process?, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 491 (2009) (saying that
while parties to an international transaction may have additional reasons to avoid national
courts, the parties’ implied rejection of court adjudication by choosing private arbitration
is equally clear in a domestic transaction).
238
Stephen P. Bedell & Louis K. Ebling, Equitable Relief in Arbitration: A Survey of
American Caselaw, 20 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 40, 79 (1988) (noting the impossibility for
arbitration to grant rescission and reformation or to provide relief not explicitly
contracted for in the arbitration agreement).
239
Rau, supra note 46, at 204.
240
Id. at 204-05. In fact, it is under the FAA that this obvious point has been called
into serious question. In First Options, the Supreme Court seemingly provided that the
parties could vest the arbitrators with the power to determine their own jurisdiction—just
as they can vest the arbitrators with the power to decide the merits of their dispute. See
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an
arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction, if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be
treated essentially the same on review as a decision on the merits). However, such
questions on the merits are not subject to appellate review, so one might reasonably ask
whether, under this Court-developed doctrine of contractual competence-competence, a
court would ever have the power to review the basic question of whether the parties
agreed to arbitration. The Court’s recent decision in Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010), seems only to confirm and add to these concerns and is discussed
more fully infra Part II.E.
241
Under many arbitration regimes, the arbitrators not only have the authority to
determine their own jurisdiction, but, in many instances, a court is precluded from conducting any more than a prima facie inquiry prior to the arbitrators’ determination. See
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courts should be a last resort, because when the parties go to court, many
of the specific benefits they sought in choosing arbitration in the first place
are lost.
The parties’ preference for confidentiality is typically lost with the first
court proceeding, as their private dispute suddenly becomes public.242 The
parties’ preference for an expert decision maker is lost to the extent their
arbitration agreement may be subject not only to a court review, but to a
jury determination.243 Perhaps most significantly, the parties’ desire for a
prompt, efficient resolution of their dispute on the merits is completely
lost in a painfully long process of court determinations—potentially
including an appellate process to the highest level—before any decision
maker ever has a chance to hear the merits of the underlying dispute.244
Whatever one’s preference for the common law, it flies in the face of basic
common sense to require parties to sacrifice the most fundamental benefits
of their bargains in order to learn the content of those bargains. Yet, this is
exactly what transpires when parties must go to court—and to appellate
courts—in order to learn the default rules governing final and binding
arbitration.
In the case of an agreement to final and binding arbitration, the parties’
expectations are best served by a complete and comprehensive statutory
scheme—not a piecemeal series of attempts to patch together an aging
statute—but a complete and comprehensive statute, drafted to reflect
normative commercial arbitration practices and the expectations of the
business community. If, however, one agrees with this proposition, this
does not end the inquiry, as legislation might be provided at either a state
or federal level.245 The potential for providing default legal rules
governing arbitration under state law is explored next.

John J. Barcelo, Who Decides the Arbitrators’ Jurisdiction? Separability and
Competence-Competence in Transnational Perspective, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
1115, 1124-30 (2003). Any subsequent review may be informed by the arbitrators’
analysis (even though it is not binding in any way on a reviewing court), and the issue
may never arise, depending on the outcome of the arbitration proceedings on the merits
(the party bringing a claim in arbitration would, of course, have no basis to contest the
arbitrators’ jurisdiction over the claim).
242
Arbitration proceedings are private, and parties are often bound to strict
confidentiality requirements. In contrast, court proceedings are a matter of public record.
243
See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006). Whatever one’s views as to juries, the parties’ intent to
refer disputes to an expert decision maker would seem contrary.
244
This is the most significant complaint expressed by business users of arbitration
today. See supra Part I.
245
For example, U.C.C. Article 2, discussed supra at Part I.C, is a model statute
enacted at the state level.
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C. What About State Law?
Arbitration may also—at least potentially—be governed by state law,
and virtually every state has enacted a statute of some sort governing
arbitration.246 The following states have general arbitration statutes that
follow the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1956 (UAA): Arkansas; Delaware;
Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Maine; Maryland;
Massachusetts; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; South Carolina; South
Dakota; Tennessee; Virginia; and Wyoming.247 This Act addresses most of
the same issues addressed by the FAA, but also adds provisions addressing
a few procedural issues ignored by the FAA, as well as an additional
specific ground for vacating an award where there was no agreement to
arbitrate.248
The following states have not explicitly adopted the UAA, but their
arbitration statutes include provisions very similar to the UAA:
Connecticut; Florida; New Hampshire; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Texas; and

246

In fact, the Uniform Arbitration Act dates back to 1955, and, by the year 2000,
forty-nine states had arbitration acts. RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (2000).
247
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-7-201 to 16-7-224 (2007); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§
5701-5725 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 7-901 to 7-922 (2007); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/1-5/23 (2007); IND. CODE §§ 34-57-2-1 to 34-57-2-22 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
679A.1-679A.19 (West 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN §§ 5-401 to 5-422 (2007); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 417.045-417.240 (LexisNexis 2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §§
5927-5949 (2007); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 3-201 to 3-234 (LexisNexis
2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (LexisNexis 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§
435.350-435.470 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to 27-5-324 (2007); NEB.
Rev. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-2601 to 25-2622 (LexisNexis 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-4810 to 15-48-240 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 21-25A-1 to 21-25A-38 (2007); TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to 29-5-320 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to 8.01-581.16
(2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-36-101 to 1-36-119 (2007).
248
See generally UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT §§ 1-25 (1956). More specifically,
section 12(a)(5) provides for vacation of an award where the arbitrators themselves (and
not the court) determined the parties had agreed to arbitrate and did so over an objection
by the party seeking vacation, and the reviewing court determines that the parties did not
agree to arbitrate the dispute. Id. at § 12(a)(5). This provision would seem to avoid the
challenges presented by the Supreme Court’s dicta in First Options, suggesting a more
deferential standard of review under such circumstances. See First Options of Chi., Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) (suggesting that an arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction,
if mandated by the parties’ agreement, should be treated essentially the same on review
as a decision on the merits). However, one might ask if this “solution” to the First
Options problem somehow makes the statute less “pro-arbitration,” in which case it
would likely be preempted by the FAA.
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Vermont.249 The Mississippi Code looks particularly similar to the UAA;
however, it does seem to add more provisions than the UAA.250 For
example, it adds a Notice to Parties provision and the Code goes more into
detail on the role of arbitrators.251 Michigan has adopted many of the same
provisions as the UAA, but has taken a rather unique approach in getting
there. The actual statute includes a general provision on enforceability, a
provision for court appointment of an arbitrator, and provisions on court
jurisdiction and venue, but little else of obvious consequence.252 However,
section 5021 directs the reader to the rules of the Michigan Supreme
Court,253 which include a number of provisions on procedure, as well as
confirmation, vacation, or modification—much like those of the UAA.254
Of course, by including such provisions in the court rules, the legislature
has delegated the power to amend these rules to the Michigan Supreme
Court.255
The following states have general arbitration statutes that follow the
Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA): Alaska; Arizona; Colorado;
Hawaii; Minnesota; Nevada; New Jersey; New Mexico; North Carolina;
North Dakota; Oklahoma; Oregon; Utah; and Washington.256 Even though

249

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 52-408 to 52-424 (West 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 682.01-682.22 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1-542:11 (2007); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2711.01-2711.16 (LexisNexis 2007); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§
7301-7320 (West 2007); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. ANN. §§ 171.001-171.098
(West 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 5641-5681 (2007).
250
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to 11-15-37 (2007).
251
Id. §§ 11-15-5, 11-15-7.
252
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.5001-600.5035 (West 2007).
253
See id. § 600.5021 (stating that “[t]he arbitration shall be conducted in accordance
with the rules of the supreme court”).
254
See MICH. CT. R. 3.602. Rule 3.602 further cross-references the reader to the
standard rule of civil procedure for subpoenas. See id. at (F)(1).
255
See MICH. CT. R. 1.201. One could reasonably ask if this might be a more
transparent and predictable approach than that of the United States Supreme Court in
periodically defining or redefining the contours of the FAA.
256
RUAA, supra note 28; ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.300-09.43.595 (2007); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to 13-22-223 (2007); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658A-1 to 658A-29
(West 2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38.206-38.248 (LexisNexis 2007); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 2A:23B-1 to 2A:23B-32 (West 2007); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-7A-1 to 44-7A-32
(West 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-569.1 to 1-569.31 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 3229.3-01 to 32.29.3-29 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1851-1881 (2007); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 36.600-36.740 (West 2007); UTAH CODE. ANN. §§ 78B-11-101 to 78B-11-131
(LexisNexis 2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.101-7.04.220 (West 2007). Arizona
and Minnesota enacted these statutes in 2010. See H.R. 2430, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ariz. 2010), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/hb2430h.pdf; H.R.
1692, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010), available at https://www.revisor.mn.gov/
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the following states have not explicitly adopted the Revised Uniform
Arbitration Act, their statutory provisions are extremely similar to those of
the RUAA: California; Georgia; and Rhode Island.257 Wisconsin has
adopted an extremely detailed arbitration statute and, more specifically, an
explicit set of default provisions.258
The Louisiana statute largely mirrors the FAA, while adding a few
provisions similar to those found in the UAA.259 Perhaps of more interest
in relation to the issues explored by this Article in Part I.D, the Louisiana
statute is extraordinarily unique in its placement. While found within
Revised Statutes, it has been placed in a section specifically addressing
“Code Ancillaries,” and within that section, among various forms of
nominate contracts. In effect, Louisiana law treats arbitration as a civil
code based nominate contract.260
The remaining states have arbitration statutes that are arguably even
more minimalist in nature than the FAA. The Alabama Code focuses
primarily on the arbitrators and a few procedural matters but does not even
clearly state that ex ante arbitration clauses are enforceable.261 West
Virginia’s statute addresses even fewer issues than Alabama’s and clearly
applies only to ex post submissions of controversies.262 The New York
statute addresses basic questions of enforceability, motions to compel or
stay proceedings, a few procedural matters, and grounds for vacation of an
award.263 However, the statute is remarkably minimalist for a state where
the most well-known American arbitration institution makes its home,264
and many complex commercial cases are undoubtedly arbitrated.
Notwithstanding the current menagerie of state laws described above,
one might reasonably suggest that—whatever the deficiencies in the
data/revisor/law/ 2010/ 0/2010-264.pdf. The District of Columbia has also adopted
RUAA. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-4401 to 16-4432 (2001).
257
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1280-1294.2 (West 2007); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-9-1 to
9-9-18 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to 10-3-21 (2007).
258
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01-788.18 (West 2007).
259
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201-9:4217 (2007).
260
As noted supra at note 86, the Québec Civil Code treats arbitration in a similar
manner.
261
ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to 6-6-16 (2007).
262
W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to 55-10-8 (West 2007). Arguably, one might
reason-ably suggest that this is not an arbitration statute at all, inasmuch as it does not
even hint at addressing ex ante arbitration agreements.
263
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7501-7514 (MCKINNEY 2007).
264
AAA Offices: Headquarters and Departments, AM. ARBITRATION ASSOC’N, http://
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=29067 (“1633 Broadway, 10th Floor, New York, New York
10019”) (last visited Mar. 27, 2011).
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FAA—the gaps in federal law could be filled by uniform state law instead
of federal law. In fact, this was one of the primary objectives behind the
relatively recent revision and promulgation of the RUAA.265
1. The RUAA as an Attempt To Fill Gaps in the Federal Arbitration
Act and Provide Default Legal Rules Under State Law
The prefatory note to the RUAA points out that, while effective in
ensuring the enforceability of arbitration agreements, earlier state law had
failed to address many issues arising in modern arbitration
agreements266—much as the FAA has ensured enforceability of arbitration
agreements but failed to address many of the issues arising in modern
arbitration agreements. The RUAA was expressly intended to provide a
“default mechanism if the parties do not have a specific agreement on a
particular issue.”267 While the drafters realized that “front end” and “back
end” issues might well be preempted by the FAA, the RUAA was
intended primarily to address default legal rules governing “arbitration
procedure,” which are virtually non-existent within the FAA.268
Ten years after its completion, the RUAA has only been adopted by
fourteen states and the District of Columbia.269 It is, thus, questionable
whether it is realistic to assume that the RUAA could serve to provide any
“uniform” default legal rules governing even “arbitration procedure” any
time in the near future. The reasons for this somewhat lackluster
performance may be manifold, but the following two possibilities come to
mind.
First, the actual provisions of the RUAA have been the subject of
significant criticism. Professor Rau frequently points to the drafting of the
RUAA in his efforts to suggest that legislators (even private legislators)
are less competent than courts to provide legal rules governing arbitration,
and in doing so points out particular specific problems with the statute.270
The RUAA also attempts to address the broad array of existing arbitration
agreements, including consumer and employee arbitration but fails to

265

RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note.
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.; see supra Part II.A.2 for a definitional explanation of “front end” issues, “back
end” issues, and “arbitration procedure.”
269
A Few Facts About the Uniform Arbitration Act (2000), NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ActSearch
Results.aspx (last visited on Mar. 27, 2011).
270
See Rau, supra note 46, at 170-79.
266
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remedy many of the failures of the FAA in this respect.271 More
importantly for the focus of this Article on business-to-business
arbitration, one of the advisors to the drafting committee levels a more
general criticism, suggesting that the default procedural rules within the
RUAA are more consistent with lawyers’ views of traditional litigation
than with business attitudes regarding the virtues of arbitration.272 To be
sure, the RUAA also has its proponents and believers.273 However, it has
failed to achieve the sort of broad acceptance normally associated with a
“uniform” state law.
Second, the extent of FAA preemption is anything but certain. While
the drafters of the RUAA assumed that the FAA did not preempt state
procedural rules, as long as such rules were pro-arbitration, the extent of
FAA preemption remains to a large degree unresolved. The FAA
unquestionably has broad preemptive force in displacing state laws
governing arbitration.274 While some continue to urge a significant role for
state law, such as the RUAA,275 and a more limited view of preemption,
the issue remains subject to significant questions.276 In the face of such
uncertainty, the only effective way to provide for default legal rules is
through new federal law.277
2. Additional Challenges in Looking to State Law for Default Legal
Rules
In addition to the challenges addressed above, there may be an even
more fundamental reason why state law cannot reasonably serve as the
271

See Sarah Rudolph Cole, The Revised Uniform Arbitration Act: Is It the Wrong
Cure?, 4 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 10, 12 (2002).
272
See Hayford, supra note 44, at 437-39. Professor Hayford is specifically singled
out as one of the major contributors, as a member of the RUAA drafting committee.
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note.
273
Roger Alford, Report to Law Revision Commission Regarding Recommendations
for Changes to California Arbitration Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1 (2003).
274
See Rau, supra note 46, at 192.
275
See generally Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A
State Role in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); Jill I. Gross, OverPreemption of State Vacatur Law: State Courts and the FAA, 3 J. AM. ARB. 1 (2004)
(suggesting a role for state law, even on “back end” issues).
276
See Drahozal, FAA Preemption, supra note 5, at 411-15 (raising doubts about the
application of state law default rules in the face of broad FAA preemption).
277
See Timothy J. Heinsz, The 2000 Revision to the Uniform Act: A Harbinger?, 3
PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 435, 435-36 (2003) (suggesting that, because of the preemptive
effect of the FAA, new federal law is the only way to address fully its many
inadequacies).
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foundation for a system of default legal rules governing arbitration. It is
worth recalling that default rules are most needed when the parties have
drafted a relatively minimalist agreement. Such a minimalist agreement
may arise from the parties’ ignorance regarding many of the more nuanced
issues that may arise in arbitration and may often be a product of the
parties’ desire to avoid focusing on dispute resolution when negotiating a
business transaction.278 Under such circumstances, it seems unlikely that a
party would include a clause expressly choosing the arbitration law of a
particular state.
A general choice-of-law provision will not typically determine the law
governing the parties’ arbitration agreement.279 Thus, the parties must, in
some manner, provide a specific choice of law with respect to their
arbitration agreement if such agreement is to be governed by state law
rather than the FAA.280 However, it seems unlikely that a typical business
party would be aware of such a need. Moreover, an express choice of law
governing an arbitration agreement would seemingly suggest to one’s
contracting partner that disputes arising out of the contemplated
transaction may be likely. Finally, the very notion of choosing law to
govern arbitration, a largely private dispute resolution procedure, may be
counter-intuitive to the typical business person—no matter how important
278

See supra Part I.A.
The arbitration agreement is separable (or severable) from and fully independent
of the parties’ broader transaction. As such, a general choice-of-law provision is typically
deemed to govern only that broader transaction and not the arbitration agreement.
Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Bermann, supra note
5, at 1018. But see Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468 (1989)
(inexplicably applying California law based on a general choice of law provision in the
parties’ contract, and never expressly overruled by subsequent precedent more in line
with the general rule). Notwithstanding the anomalous result in Volt, few, if any, would
suggest that a court should apply state law to an arbitration agreement based solely on a
general choice-of-law provision in the parties’ contract.
280
In the absence of any express choice, an arbitration agreement is almost
universally governed by the law of the place of arbitration—the lex arbitri. Bermann,
supra note 5, at 1018-19. Thus, one might reasonably ask if the choice of a particular
state as the place of arbitration also amounts to a choice of that state’s arbitration law. See
Jack Garvey & Totten Heffelfinger, Towards Federalizing U.S. International
Commercial Arbitration Law, 25 INT’L LAW 209, 216 (1991) (raising the same uncertain
question almost twenty years ago). However, as a matter of practice, courts give virtually
no analysis to the issue and simply apply the FAA. Id. at 1018-22. Presumably, the broad
preemptive effect of the FAA gives rise to a presumption that the FAA governs, as the lex
arbitri, rather than any otherwise applicable state law. See Drahozal, FAA Preemption,
supra note 5, at 411-15 (expressing doubt regarding the implied intent reflected in the
choice of a place of arbitration as sufficient to amount to a choice of state default rules).
At the very least, the current state of jurisprudence on choice of law governing arbitration
gives rise to considerable uncertainty.
279
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that choice may later prove to be. As such, it seems that state arbitration
law—even if otherwise perfectly suitable—would rarely, if ever, apply to
govern the parties’ arbitration agreement when they most need default
legal rules.
Moreover, the decision of the United States Supreme Court, in Volt,281
highlights the uncertainty in choosing state law. Whether a question of the
effect of a choice-of-law provision or the effect of FAA preemption,282 the
parties’ attempt to invoke state law will often lead them back to federal
court for an answer to these questions. Thus, their intent to arbitrate their
disputes and stay away from the courthouse is once again undermined.
3. State Laws Governing International Arbitration
Thirteen states have adopted specific laws governing international
commercial arbitration, and eight of these states have, to varying degrees,
based these statutes on the UNCITRAL Model Law.283 These state law
formulations governing international commercial arbitration also suffer
many of the same challenges discussed above, including federal
preemption and the necessity of some sort of specific choice of state
arbitration law by the parties—as well as all of the uncertainties present
therein. However, the adoptions of the Model Law raise some additional
issues worth mentioning briefly.
Unlike the RUAA, the UNCITRAL Model Law is a complete modern
law governing all aspects of arbitration, from commencement through
final award, including actions for set aside or enforcement.284 As such, its
complete adoption285 raises far more potential conflicts with the FAA than
281

489 U.S. 468 (1989); see also discussion of case cited supra note 279.
See supra Part II.C.1.
283
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note (indicating that twelve states have enacted
specialized provisions regarding international commercial arbitration, of which seven
have based these enactments largely upon the UNCITRAL Model Law; however,
Florida’s 2010 enactment in the following list adds one more state to this list). The
UNCITRAL Model Law serves, to a large degree, as the basis for the statutes adopted by
California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, North Carolina, Oregon, and Texas.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1287.12-1297.337 (Deering 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 50a100 to 50a-139 (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048 (LexisNexis 2010); 710
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 30/1-5 to 30/25-30 (LexisNexis2010); LA. REV.STAT. §§ 9:42419:4276 (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.31 to 1-567.67 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. §§
36.450-36.558 (2010); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 172.001-172.175 (West
2010).
284
RUAA, supra note 28, at Prefatory Note.
285
Not all of the eight states utilizing the Model Law as the basis for their own
legislation adopted all of its provisions. However, Connecticut, Florida, Louisiana and
282
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the RUAA. In addition to the provisions on “arbitration procedure,”286 the
Model Law provisions on “back end” and “front end” issues differ
significantly from the FAA.
The UNCITRAL Model Law, like the New York Convention, includes
different bases for set aside or non-enforcement than those contained in
FAA section 10.287 Inasmuch as section 10 has been deemed to be a
mandatory legal rule rather than default provisions,288 the likelihood of
preemption seems far greater.289 At the front end of the arbitral process,
the Model Law provides for statutory competence-competence, in direct
contrast to FAA section 4.290 Under section 4, a court must first decide any
issue as to whether the parties agreed to arbitration, whereas Model Law
Article 16 grants the arbitrators the power to make this determination.291 It
is now clear that section 4 is far less of a mandatory rule of law than
section 10, as section 4 may yield to a “clear and unmistakable” contrary
choice by the parties to delegate jurisdictional decisions to the

Oregon substantially adopted the Model Law in its entirety. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§
50a-100 to 50a-139; FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 684.0001-684.0048; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:4241-9:4276; OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36.450-36.558, and all eight of these states have
adopted the Model Law provisions on competence-competence (the jurisdiction of the
tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction). CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1287.161; CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 50a-116; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.0001-684.0017; 710 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 30/15-5; LA. REV. STAT. 9:4256; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46; OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 36.484; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.001-172.082.
286
While different than those contained in RUAA, the Model Law procedural
provisions raise the same sort of preemption issues as RUAA.
287
While different from section 10 of the FAA, the Model Law and New York Convention contain essentially identical provisions for both. Model Law Article 36 is
identical to New York Convention Article V on enforcement issues, and Model Law
Article 34 differs only in terms of the applicable law on the final two bases for set aside.
The latter two bases address subject matter arbitrability (not to be confused with the
broad misuse of the term by the U.S. Supreme Court) and public policy, each applying
the law of the place of enforcement in actions to enforce and the place of arbitration in
actions to set aside an award.
288
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, 552 U.S. 576 (2008) (precluding the parties from
agreeing to expanded judicial review by holding that such review was statutorily limited
to those grounds listed in section 10).
289
In fact, one might reasonably infer that the California, Illinois, and Texas
legislatures consciously omitted Articles 34 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law
addressing set aside and enforcement based on their likely preemption by the FAA. North
Carolina’s approach is more curious, inasmuch as it appears to add its own grounds for
set aside, different from either the FAA or Model Law. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.46.
290
See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 16.
291
Id.
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arbitrators.292 However, section 4 of the FAA is much less likely to defer
to state law, as the issue is unequivocally one governed by “‘substantive
federal arbitration law.’”293
Lastly, it is worth recalling the discussion in Part II.A.3.b regarding
Chapter 3 of the FAA and its incorporation of the IACAC Rules, which
are themselves based on the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. While the
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules are, in many ways, quite similar to the
UNCITRAL Model Law, they are not in fact the same. Thus, an
arbitration agreement governed by Chapter 3 under the FAA, but perhaps
subject to a state adoption of the Model Law based on the parties’ express
choice, would likely present some particularly challenging preemption
questions, along with the previously discussed issues relating to conflicts
between FAA Chapter 1 and Chapter 3.294
Thus, any state law attempting to remedy the deficiencies in the FAA
regarding international commercial arbitration is even more likely to raise
preemption issues and questions giving rise to uncertainty in the arbitral
process, thus presenting an even greater likelihood of judicial
involvement. The role of the FAA in United States arbitration is far too
central to simply work around it. For effective legal reform, the menagerie
of the FAA and its considerable body of federal common law must be
replaced by a single, new, comprehensive statute. However, one final
question remains. Are default legal rules truly needed, or can private rules
adopted by the parties serve the same purpose?
D. Can Institutional and Other Private Rules Serve as a Substitute for
Default Legal Rules?
One might reasonably question whether there is any need for a set of
default legal rules to govern arbitration agreements in view of the broad
and easy availability of institutional and ad hoc rules295 from which parties
may choose.296 However, the parties may fail to choose any rules. As
292

See First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943-44 (1995) (explaining
that the parties may ask the arbitrators to decide this issue just like any other issue they
might assign to the arbitrators).
293
Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781 n.4 (2010). This issue
is more fully discussed in Part II.E below.
294
See supra Part II.A.3.b.
295
Ad hoc rules, such as the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, are typically used in the
absence of institutional administration of the arbitration proceedings.
296
See, e.g., Rau, supra note 46, at 180 (suggesting, in the context of international
commercial arbitration, that the vast majority of parties to arbitration agreements
designate either a set of institutional or ad hoc rules).

278

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:227

indicated earlier, the only requirement for an effective arbitration
agreement is a written agreement to final and binding resolution of a
defined set of disputes.297 Admittedly, the concern expressed earlier about
sending negative signals to one’s contracting partner by negotiating over
dispute resolution298 may not be as acute with respect to selecting a set of
rules. There is obviously a substantial difference between including fifteen
pages of detailed arbitration procedures and agreeing to arbitrate under a
well-known set of institutional rules, which happen themselves to be
fifteen pages long. However, there may remain other reasons why parties
fail to include a set of rules in their arbitration agreement.
The parties may be attempting to save money by omitting any
institutional reference. In fact, this is exactly why parties sometimes
choose ad hoc over institutional arbitration.299 However, parties and their
attorneys may or may not be aware of the existence of ad hoc rules,
detached from the use of a particular arbitral institution. Thus, a party
seeking to avoid dispute resolution in court, but hesitant to commit to the
costs of institutional arbitration and unaware of the existence of ad hoc
rules, might very well propose arbitration without designating any rules at
all. Again, it is important to remember that not all contracts that include
arbitration clauses are drafted by lawyers. Thus, it is quite likely there will
always be a significant minority300 of arbitration agreements that do not
include any designation of rules.
Moreover, there is nothing inconsistent with parallel sets of (1) default
legal rules and (2) private rules for autonomous incorporation into parties’
contracts. By way of comparative example, parties to a sale of goods can
easily designate INCOTERMS 2000301 (or some other set of trade terms)
to govern various issues involving shipping and passage of risk (much like
parties to an arbitration agreement can designate a set of institutional
rules). However, UCC Article 2 also provides a set of default provisions
addressing these same issues in the event the parties do not—precisely in
order to avoid later disputes over omitted terms.
Lastly, there are certain terms that simply do not work effectively
based on autonomous choice, whether based on the parties’ own terms or
their incorporation of a set of arbitration rules, because of inherent flaws
involving circularity. The most classic example of this problem involves
297

See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part I.A.
299
MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 330.
300
For purposes of this Article, the author is willing to concede this is likely a
minority, though an empirical analysis might be interesting—assuming one could
actually sample small business agreements, as well as large.
301
See Incoterms 2010, supra note 67.
298
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the doctrine of competence-competence, or the power of an arbitral
tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction.
E. The Problem with Contractual Competence-Competence
FAA section 4 provides that a court must decide any question of
whether the parties agreed to arbitration of the dispute in question.302 In
contrast, most modern arbitration laws grant the arbitral tribunal the power
to make this determination itself, deciding its own jurisdiction—though
solely as an initial matter, and fully subject to later (or concurrent)303 court
review within a limited statutory framework.304 However, one might
reasonably ask whether, under the FAA, the parties to an arbitration
agreement could not accomplish a similar result, in effect contractually
granting the arbitrators the power to decide their own jurisdiction. The
United States Supreme Court appeared to answer, in First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan,305 that parties could do exactly that.306 The
parties could ask the arbitrators to decide the jurisdictional question307 in
302

9 U.S.C. § 4 (2006).
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 26, at art. 8 (providing for the
possibility of concurrent jurisdictional determinations by the arbitral tribunal and a proper
court).
304
See, e.g., id. at art. 16 (granting the arbitrators the authority to determine their own
jurisdiction); id. at art. 34, 36 (providing for court review in an action to set aside or
enforce any award—but only on certain enumerated grounds, one of which is that the
parties did not agree to arbitration of the dispute in question). While the doctrine of
competence-competence operates differently in different legal systems as to “timing” (as
to determinations by courts or arbitrators), the doctrine has gained near universal
acceptance in international practice, in no small measure due to the influence of the
UNCITRAL Model Law. Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116-17. While this doctrine allows
arbitrators to determine their own jurisdiction (either concurrently or prior to a court
determination), a court will always have the final word on the issue—typically on a de
novo basis. Id. at 1123. Even French law, which is perhaps the most extreme in granting
arbitrators the “first” decision regarding jurisdiction. Id. at 1124-27; Richard W. Hulbert,
Institutional Rules and Arbitral Jurisdiction: When Party Intent is Not “Clear and
Unmistakable,” 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 545, 565-66 (2009) (providing for subsequent
judicial review on the question of whether the parties formed a valid arbitration
agreement).
305
514 U.S. 938 (1995).
306
See id. at 943. This answer was by no means self-evident, as section 4 might also
reasonably be read as providing for “mandatory” determination by a competent court on
the question of whether the parties have validly agreed to arbitrate their dispute. See
generally Horton, supra note 128.
307
The Supreme Court refers to this issue as one of “arbitrability.” See First Options
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. at 942. However, this Article will use the terms
303
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the same manner they could ask the arbitrators to decide any other
question, such as the merits of their dispute.308 While seemingly a
straightforward exercise of party autonomy to refer a dispute to
arbitration, this decision raised a host of questions.309 If the basis of the
arbitral tribunal’s power to decide its own jurisdiction is no different than
its power to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute, as the Court
suggested,310 then the tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction is subject to
review only under the standards of FAA section 10, which does not
include any reference to the lack of an agreement to arbitrate.311 As such,
the arbitral tribunal would not only have the power to decide its own
jurisdiction, but would have the exclusive, and largely non-reviewable,
power to do so.312 At the very least, the Court had seemingly provided for
contractually agreed upon competence-competence,313 so long as the
parties’ intent was “clear and unmistakable.”314 The Court’s opinion in
First Options undoubtedly led to a number of new drafting ideas with
respect to arbitration agreements, two of which are particularly relevant
for our analysis here.
“jurisdiction” or “competence,” in recognition of their more universal use in arbitration
practice, globally. Whereas the Supreme Court deems a dispute not “arbitrable” if the
parties did not agree to arbitration, the more universal practice is to say that an arbitration
tribunal lacks “jurisdiction” or is not “competent” to decide a dispute if the parties have
not so agreed. The problem with using this “arbitrability” term with respect to the
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitration is that it also has many other
meanings that are quite different and more precise, and its use regarding the agreement to
arbitrate can lead to unnecessary confusion. See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at
409-10.
308
First Options, 514 U.S. at 942.
309
See, e.g., William W. Park, The Arbitrability Dicta in First Options v. Kaplan:
What Sort of Kompetenz-Kompetenz Has Crossed the Atlantic? 12 ARB. INT’L 137
(1996); Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 287
(1999).
310
See First Options, 514 U.S. at 943.
311
9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). The only possible provision a court might invoke in
attempting to review a tribunal’s jurisdictional decision is section 10(4)—however, any
use of this section for such a purpose is potentially problematic on a much larger scale, as
more fully explained below. See, e.g., Hulbert, supra note 304, at 546-47 (pointing out
the potential that the First Options dicta might be read as providing not only for the
power of the arbitrator to decide the jurisdictional question, but also making such
decision immune from judicial review).
312
It was not at all clear that the Court intended such a result, but the Court’s
language certainly suggested this possibility.
313
If granted by the parties, the arbitral tribunal would have the power to determine
its own jurisdiction—i.e., it would possess the competence to determine its own
competence.
314
First Options, 514 U.S. at 944.
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First, a number of United States arbitral institutions have included
provisions within their domestic rules giving the arbitral tribunal the
power to determine its own jurisdiction.315 Of course, one might seriously
question whether an arbitration agreement including a set of rules, within
which the arbitral tribunal was granted the power to decide its own
jurisdiction, could possibly amount to “clear and unmistakable” intent to
consign this issue to the arbitrators.316 However, a substantial majority of
federal courts dealing with the issue have had little difficulty finding such
consent in exactly this manner.317 In effect, a contractual version of
competence-competence is arguably becoming the norm within the United
States, notwithstanding its omission in the FAA. However, it is worth
noting the obvious at this stage. The arbitrators’ authority to decide their
own jurisdiction is based solely on whether the parties agreed to
arbitration in the first instance. Thus, any grant of such authority is
arguably fundamentally flawed, as a matter of contractual consent, based
on its inherent circularity. Perhaps even more importantly, the arbitrators’
decision may be virtually unreviewable under FAA section 10, unless
perhaps the parties also contracted for heightened judicial review. This is
where the second new idea came into play. In order to alleviate any
concerns a court might have that an arbitrator’s decision might be

315

See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND
MEDIATION PROCEDURES 7-8 r.7 (2010) (providing for determination by the arbitral
tribunal of “the existence or validity of a contract of which an arbitration clause forms a
part”); JAMS, supra note 61, at 14 r.11(c) (providing for determination by the arbitral
tribunal of “[j]urisdictional and arbitrability disputes, including disputes over the
formation, existence, validity, interpretation or scope of the agreement under which
Arbitration is sought”). The AAA Rule providing for competence-competence was first
added to its domestic rules in 1999, just four years after the First Options decision. See
Hulbert, supra note 304, at 563.
316
If agreeing to a term incorporated in a large body of rules amounts to “clear and
unmistakable” consent, one might reasonably ask what sort of consent does not satisfy
this purportedly heightened standard for proving consent.
317
See, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co., 398 F.3d 205, 208-09 (2d Cir.
2005); Terminix Int’l Co. v. Palmar Ranch Ltd. P’ship, 432 F.3d 1327, 1332-33 (11th
Cir. 2005) (finding “clear and unmistakable” evidence based on the parties’ agreement to
arbitration under the AAA Rules, including Rule 7); Mark Berger, Arbitration and
Arbitrability: Toward an Expectation Model, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 753, 790 (2004);
Joseph L. Franco, Comment, Casually Finding the Clear and Unmistakable: A ReEvaluation of First Options in Light of Recent Lower Court Decisions, 10 LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 443, 467-70 (2007).
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unreviewable, parties inserted contractual provisions for subsequent
judicial review.318
In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson,319 the problems with contractual competence-competence were squarely presented. The Rent-ACenter contract executed by its employee, Jackson, included a provision in
the arbitration agreement itself, clearly and unmistakably assigning to the
arbitral tribunal the authority to decide any and all questions related to its
jurisdiction, including the question of whether the parties had concluded a
binding arbitration agreement—and assigning this decisional authority on
an “exclusive” initial basis, though still subject to later judicial review.320
Not surprisingly, Rent-A-Center relied on First Options in arguing that
this provision was fully enforceable and the initial jurisdictional question
was solely and exclusively for the arbitrators to decide.321 In effect, RentA-Center took the Court at its word in First Options and drafted an
arbitration agreement seeking to take full advantage of the Court’s dicta.
Jackson asserted an unconscionability defense to the purported
arbitration agreement322 and, more importantly for the issue before the
Court, wanted this issue decided by a court under FAA section 4, and not
by an arbitrator.323 Jackson pointed out the obvious flaws in First Options
applied to these circumstances. The arbitrators’ authority to determine
jurisdiction could not logically rely on the very agreement that Jackson
was contesting as unconscionable.324 This would amount to a classic
318

At least this was the thinking before the Supreme Court decided Hall Street
Associates v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
319
130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
320
See Brief for the Petitioner at 4-5 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772
(2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315; Joint Appendix at 29-30 exhibit
1 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs
LEXIS 153. Under the parties’ agreement, this “exclusivity” was purely temporal. The
arbitral tribunal would have the exclusive opportunity to decide the issue—as an initial
matter. However, this decision was later to be subject to plenary court review under the
parties’ agreement. Id. As more fully explained below, the effect of the Court’s decision
in Hall Street likely renders this provision for plenary review ineffective.
321
Brief for the Petitioner at 11-14 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 315.
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Brief for Respondent at 3-4 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (No.
09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260. Jackson asserted that the arbitration
agreement, specifically, is unconscionable—not the container contract—thereby
attempting to avoid the doctrine of separability. Id. at 7-8. While an unconscionability
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example of circularity.325 Moreover, surely such circular reasoning could
not serve as the basis for granting the arbitrators the “exclusive” authority
to make this determination.
As presented, this case seemed to require the Court to either:
(1) follow the First Options dicta to its logical conclusion, enforcing the
parties’ contractual delegation of competence-competence to the
arbitrators or (2) explain that the court did not really mean precisely what
it said in First Options. Interestingly, Jackson suggested a way the Court
might limit the dicta in First Options, arguing that the Court merely stated
that the parties could grant the arbitral tribunal the authority to determine
the “scope” of their arbitration agreement, provided the parties actually
had an enforceable arbitration agreement in the first instance.326 However,
Jackson argued, the latter issue was necessarily one for the courts—no
matter what the parties’ agreement said.327 In a 5-4 decision, the Court
took the first course and did so, in large part, by relying on the doctrine of
separability.328 The case nicely illustrates the fundamental problem of
circularity associated with contractual competence-competence.
Separability and competence-competence represent distinct, but
related, doctrines.329 Competence-competence provides the arbitrators
with the power to decide threshold jurisdictional issues, while separability
ensures the viability of the tribunal’s decision on the substantive dispute
assigned to it—assuming it determines that it has jurisdiction to decide the
substantive dispute in question.
For all of its continuing controversy,330 the Supreme Court’s original
decision to embrace separability in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
325

In effect, one cannot lift oneself off the floor by pulling on one’s own bootstraps—
no matter how hard one pulls. Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2779, 2781
(2010); Brief for Respondent at 24, 40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260.
326
Brief for Respondent at 39-40 Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010)
(No. 09-497), 2010 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 260.
327
Id. at 23-31.
328
See generally Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2788 (2010) (finding
that “whether the arbitration agreement is unconscionable is itself severable from the
merits of the underlying dispute, which involves a claim of employment discrimination”)
(emphasis in original).
329
Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1116.
330
See Rent-A-Center, 130 S. Ct. at 2785 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (continuing, over
forty years later, to describe the Court’s decision in Prima Paint as “‘fantastic’” and
“likely erroneous”); see also Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration,
and the Demise of Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with
Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 841-48 (2003) (providing a substantial
critique of the separability doctrine).
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Manufacturing331 was arguably an unremarkable, and entirely necessary,
extension by implication of section 2 of the FAA.332 Section 2 makes
enforceable an agreement to resolve a contractual dispute by arbitration,
and parties subject to contractual claims will often raise traditional contract validity defenses such as duress, mistake, fraud, or unconscionability.
The defenses are often raised as a matter of course, and they are also
frequently intertwined with the merits of the dispute referred to arbitration.
Thus, if the arbitral tribunal could not effectively decide these questions,
the entire arbitral process would almost certainly be subject to lengthy
delays, and the agreement to arbitrate would often be rendered
ineffective.333
Two simple examples illustrate the importance of the doctrine of
separability to an effective arbitration regime. In each case, A brings an
action against B for breach of a contract that includes an arbitration
agreement. B raises a defense of mutual mistake, asserting that the
contract is therefore voidable.334 Under the doctrine of separability, the
arbitral tribunal is empowered to decide this defense, without any effect on
the arbitration clause contained within the potentially voidable main
contract. Without separability, in example one, a court might decide this
defense. However, this would essentially resolve this particular case, and
the parties would be deprived of their contractual agreement to arbitrate
the dispute. Still without separability, in example two, an arbitrator might
go ahead and try to decide the parties’ dispute. However, the arbitrator
could only issue an enforceable, preclusive decision in one direction—that
of denying B’s defense. If the arbitrator decided in favor of the defense, he
or she would also necessarily have to acknowledge the lack of any
remaining jurisdiction to do anything but send the parties away without
resolving their dispute. Separability, of course, resolves this very
important practical problem—albeit with an admitted bit of theoretical
“sleight of hand”—by allowing the arbitrator to decide the parties’
dispute, including any invalidity defense involving the main contract and
to do so in favor of either party in an enforceable, preclusive award.335
In Rent-A-Center, the parties’ arguments largely centered over the
interpretation of the First Options dicta: was “delegation” largely limited
to scope (or, perhaps, other similar issues) or did “delegation” include the
question of whether the parties had agreed to arbitrate anything at all? The
331
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9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
333
See MORRISSEY & GRAVES, supra note 8, at 368-71.
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For the sake of clarity and simplicity, this is the only issue in this set of
hypotheticals.
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dissent suggests that the majority announced a rule not advocated by either
party,336 and at least one commentator seems to agree.337 However, the
majority’s decision in Rent-A-Center is arguably nothing more than an
inevitable result of a literal reading of First Options taken to its logical
conclusion, including the necessary application of the doctrine of
separability.
In First Options, the Court stated that the parties could delegate
questions regarding jurisdiction (or, in the Court’s vernacular,
“arbitrability”) to the arbitrator, including the questions of whether the
parties had agreed to arbitration at all or whether the dispute in question
fell within the scope of that agreement.338 In doing so, the Court explained
that the parties’ agreement to delegate these jurisdictional decisions to the
arbitrator was the equivalent of an agreement to delegate decisions
regarding their dispute on the merits, and was subject to the same standard
of review as a decision on the merits—that contained in section 10 of the
FAA.339
Taken at face value, the dicta from First Options said, quite clearly,
that the parties could delegate jurisdictional decisions to the arbitrator,
whose decision on the issue would be equally final to that of a decision on
the merits—as long as this delegation is “clear and unmistakable.”340
Thus, unless the Court was prepared to ignore or, in some way, “refine” its
earlier First Options dicta, its decision in Rent-A-Center was virtually a
foregone conclusion; the question of whether Jackson’s agreement to
arbitrate might be unconscionable and, therefore, invalid had been “clearly
and unmistakably” delegated to the arbitrator.
What apparently surprised some,341 including the dissenters,342 was the
majority’s application of the doctrine of separability under these
circumstances. However, if the parties’ delegation of the question of
jurisdiction to the arbitrator is no different from their “delegation” of their
dispute on the merits, then the majority’s approach seems quite logical.
The “delegation provision” is separable from the arbitration agreement in
336

See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. at 2782 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See Cross, supra note 15.
338
First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942-45 (1995); see also
Barcelo, supra note 241, at 1133 (explaining the rebuttable presumption against the
former and contrasting it with the presumption in favor of the arbitrator’s power to
determine the latter).
339
First Options, 514 U.S. at 943 (1995).
340
Id. at 944.
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See, e.g., Cross, supra note 15.
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See Rent-A-Center v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2781-82 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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exactly the same manner that the arbitration agreement is separable from
the main contract, of which it often forms a part.343 Moreover, this
application of the doctrine of separability is fully consistent with its
purpose, as explained above. Absent the doctrine of separability, the
arbitrator would be empowered only to make a positive decision on
jurisdiction pursuant to the “delegation” clause, because a negative
decision would deprive the arbitral tribunal of its jurisdiction on the
“delegation” question, thereby negating the preclusive effect of any
decision.
The problem with the Court’s decision in Rent-A-Center does not lie in
its application of separability in that case. Instead, the problem arises from
the First Options dicta and the entire notion of contractual competencecompetence, which the majority in Rent-A-Center simply applied as
written.
As mentioned earlier, the arbitration agreement at issue in Rent-ACenter included a provision for expanded judicial review of any decision
of the arbitrators.344 However, this provision is almost certainly ineffective
today based on the Court’s decision in Hall Street, strictly limiting judicial
review to the very narrow grounds provided in FAA section 10.345 Thus, if
Rent-A-Center and Hall Street are read together, as written, they clarify
that the arbitrator’s decision on jurisdiction will be final, subject only to
review under section 10, which does not include any review of whether
the parties concluded a valid arbitration agreement.346 The arbitrator’s
decision is, essentially, unreviewable—at any stage—under the Court’s
interpretation of contractual competence-competence.347
343

Id. at 2777-79.
Id. at 2781.
345
See Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
346
Of course, there would be no reason to provide for such review if section 4
provided for mandatory jurisdictional decisions by a court in the first instance. See
Horton, supra note 128, at 4-6 (explaining the inherent inconsistency in the Court’s
treatment of section 10 as mandatory and exclusive, while treating section 4 as a default
rule subject to the parties’ contrary agreement).
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Admittedly, it is possible that “manifest disregard” has, in some form, survived
Hall Street. See Nicholas R. Weiskopf & Matthew S. Mulqueen, Hall Street, Judicial
Review of Arbitral Awards, and Federal Preemption, 29 REV. LITIG. 361, 367-71 (2010)
(providing, perhaps, some basis for review of a particularly egregious jurisdictional
decision). It is also possible that a court might resort to section 10(4), providing for
review and setting aside of an award in which the arbitrators “exceeded their powers, or
so imperfectly executed them ….” However, the use of this provision, like the “manifest
disregard” standard is fraught with the potential to undermine the finality of awards on
the merits of an arbitral dispute, because the Court has said that “delegation” of the
jurisdictional question is governed by exactly the same legal principles as an agreement
to arbitrate the merits of the parties’ contract dispute.
344
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Taken at face value, this result seems bizarre, though such a
perspective is admittedly affected by one’s own subjective lens. However,
the result is objectively and quite clearly inconsistent with the standards
for enforcement of international arbitration awards under the New York
Convention. The Convention provides for recognition of arbitration
agreements, unless a court finds “said agreement is null and void,”348 and
provides for enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, subject to an
exception where a court finds the parties’ “[arbitration] agreement is not
valid.”349 As explained in Part II.A.3.a, the New York Convention applies
to a variety of non-domestic agreements and awards and is also the legal
instrument through which awards rendered in the U.S. are typically
enforced abroad.350 This inconsistency between FAA section 10 and the
New York Convention creates a very real possibility that an award that is
not subject to “vacation” under section 10 might nonetheless be
unenforceable under the New York Convention. Such inconsistencies can
easily be avoided by simply ensuring the statutory grounds for vacation of
an award mirror those for non-enforcement, and also reflect those for
judicial recognition of an arbitration agreement351—an approach taken in
the vast majority of modern arbitration statutes, but largely ignored in the
implementation of the New York and Panama conventions under the FAA.
The purpose of an arbitration agreement is to avoid court proceedings
in resolving any dispute arising from the parties’ commercial relationship.
An arbitrator’s decision on such issues is necessarily protected from
subsequent scrutiny in order to give effect to the parties’ bargain for an
efficient and final resolution of their dispute—without going to court.
However, these same principles are misplaced when the issue is whether
the parties ever agreed in the first instance to arbitrate anything. In this
latter case, a court must—at some point—have an opportunity to
determine whether the parties in fact gave up their right to judicial
process. The statutory doctrine of competence-competence provides for
efficiency in allowing an arbitrator to make this determination, while also
ensuring the availability of meaningful judicial review at some point in the
process. The same cannot be accomplished through the Supreme Court’s
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efforts to create a contractual form of competence-competence—at least
not as currently articulated.352
Any attempt to address competence-competence through arbitral rules
is subject to the same deficiencies as an express agreement by the parties.
Even if sufficient to constitute “clear and unmistakable” consent, the
effect of such consent amounts to a final and absolute delegation of the
issue, without meaningful judicial review. Nor can state law effectively
provide for competence-competence, inasmuch as the issue is
unequivocally one governed by “‘substantive federal arbitration law.’”353
The doctrine of competence-competence is central to modern commercial arbitration and is arguably an absolute necessity for any modern
statute. It cannot be effectively invoked by contract. Instead, an effective
competence-competence regime must be a part of the statutory
background,354 invoked not by the terms of the parties’ disputed
arbitration agreement, but by the very existence of such a dispute brought
to the attention of the arbitral tribunal. It must also be subject to
meaningful judicial review, whatever the timing of such review. Many
important arbitral doctrines can be invoked by either private rules or by
the law governing the arbitration. However, competence-competence must
come from the underlying legal regime. Neither party autonomy, nor
private rules, nor state arbitration law can reasonably serve as a substitute.
CONCLUSION
The time has come to jettison the aged and arcane U.S. Federal
Arbitration Act. It has fully served its original purpose of making
arbitration agreements enforceable355 and now serves only as a giant
352

To the author’s knowledge, there is only a single historical example of such a
purely contractual doctrine of competence-competence, which was also arguably absolute
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“black hole” into which the courts pour more and more decisions and into
which parties to arbitration agreements—agreements expressly intended to
avoid courts—pour more and more of their money. The only fully
functional way to provide an effective set of default rules for arbitration
agreements is to do so with a new, comprehensive, modern arbitration
statute, and the most efficient way to do this is with a single statute
governing all commercial arbitration—whether domestic or
international—that fully comports with modern global standards.356 This is
not to suggest that Congress should simply adopt, in total, any particular
model or national law, but simply that the time has come to draft a modern
statute to govern arbitration in the United States, and we can learn much
from those who have already considered and adopted such statutes.
In commenting on a series of conference presentations, Professor
Carbonneau recently observed that the presentations on international
commercial arbitration were generally less controversial and more cogent
than those on domestic arbitration, which had focused on disparate party
arbitration—the most controversial aspect of U.S. arbitration law.357 He
further noted that “arbitration in the trans-border context has thus far
escaped being mauled by the claws of politicalization [and] is vital to
global commerce ….”358 If we can somehow separate commercial,
business-to-business arbitration—both domestic and international—from
the political morass of disparate party arbitration,359 then we should be
able to find common ground in developing and adopting a modern federal
arbitration statute to govern this dispute resolution mechanism so vital to
U.S. commerce—both at home and abroad.
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of 1998 (an almost complete adoption of the provisions of the UNCITRAL Model Law),
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